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ABSTRACT
The Russian Federation‘s reliance on nuclear weapons for national security will
steadily increase over time. Based on current evidence and historical data, the Russian
state will be unable to recruit, arm, train, equip, reform, and fund their conventional
forces well enough to match up with capabilities of what it views to be its potential
adversaries. Russia‘s historic experience with invasion and vulnerable geographic
position reinforce the need for a powerful weapon with which to maintain the current
regime and ensure its territorial integrity. Declining demographics and persistent social
illnesses will reduce the number of eligible male candidates able to serve in the military.
Also, Russia‘s leaders perceive a threat environment in which there are persistent threats
to the existence of the Russian Federation. Finally, nuclear weapons provide a relatively
cheap and effective weapon that possesses massive destructive capability, is easily
deployable, and demands respect from any potential adversary.
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
The Russian Army is never as strong as it describes itself but never as weak as it
seems from the outside.
-Old Russian adage, cited in Dmitri Trenin and Aleksei Malashenko,
Russia’s Restless Frontier

The main foundation of national security in Russia remains, and will remain for a
long time to come, nuclear deterrence forces.
-President Vladimir Putin, October 2, 2003
In 2005, then-President Putin described the collapse of the Soviet Union as ―the
greatest geopolitical catastrophe‖ of the 20th century.1 At least from the Russian
perspective, he was, and still is, correct. The collapse of the Soviet Union led to
substantial political, economic, and social upheavals. Russia lost control over huge
swaths of territory, some of which it had controlled for centuries. Ethnic Russians living
in the newly independent states suddenly found themselves in the minority. The failures
by the new political leadership under Boris Yeltsin only exacerbated the consequences of
the collapse making the 1990s a chaotic period in Russian history.
The Russian military suffered heavily during the post-Soviet era of the 1990s. It
saw massive budget cuts and downsizing. Yeltsin perceived the military as a political
threat to his position and did his best to reduce and mitigate the strengths of the military.
The economic crisis that followed the collapse necessitated deep budget cuts. Cuts in
military budgets, manpower, and political influence, all of which had been substantial
1

―Putin Deplores Collapse of the USSR,‖ BBC News, April 25, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm.
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during the Soviet era, severely diminished Russia‘s conventional military forces. The loss
of funding impacted current military construction projects, salaries, benefits, and living
conditions for Russia soldiers. These cuts, compounded by the large losses in territory
with the breakup of the Soviet Union and United States‘ demonstrated technological edge
during the first Gulf War, also greatly hurt morale amongst the Russian Armed Forces.
Today, the Russian Federation has regained its balance. Conditions in Russia have
substantially improved since 2000 with the Presidency of Vladimir Putin and the
continuation of his policies under the current President, Dimitri Medvedev. However, the
Russian military still lags behind in modernization and capability. Some experts estimate
that currently Russia is as much as 20-30 years behind the West in many areas of
technical progress.2 The conventional military forces of the Russian Federation have yet
to recover and overcome their demonstrated inefficiencies and weaknesses. Until that
time, Russia‘s leaders feel that their country is vulnerable to outside attack, even though
there does not appear to be any imminent outside threat. This has forced a reliance on
nuclear weapons – both strategic and tactical – by Russia‘s leaders as a ―stop gap‖
measure until reform and modernization of conventional forces allow them to take on the
role of deterring attacks and defending the Russian Federation. However, Russia‘s
reliance on nuclear weapons may turn out to be more than a temporary solution to its
national security needs.
The Russian Federation will be forced to make nuclear weapons the primary
means of ensuring its national security. At this time, the Russian government faces
numerous foreign and domestic obstacles that will make it unable to depend on its
2

―Russia to Start Licensed Production of Foreign Military Equipment,‖ RIA Novosti, May 21, 2010,
http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100521/159099501.html.
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conventional forces to ensure Russia‘s national security. Compounded, these obstacles
will increase Russian reliance of its nuclear forces because nuclear weapons will provide
the only assured guaranteed means of successfully deterring or defeating an external
threat. First, the sheer size of territory that the Russian military is responsible for
defending makes nuclear weapons necessary to ensure its territorial integrity. Second, the
perception by Russia‘s leaders, elites, and general population that Russia is surrounded
by threats will demand strong nuclear forces. Third, unfavorable social issues such as
falling birthrates and an increase in alcoholism, drug use, and disease amongst the
Russian population will severely limit the number of eligible candidates for military
service. Fourth, Russia‘s conventional forces – air, sea and land – are currently unable to
ensure the defense of the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, nuclear weapons hold a
number of clear advantages over conventional forces in terms of cost, maintenance, and
effectiveness in military conflict. However, crossing the nuclear threshold is still
considered to be a last and desperate measure. Fifth, based on current evidence, Russia‘s
military industry will not be able to provide conventional military equipment equivalent
to what is currently being produced or purchased by other states. Finally, nuclear
weapons represent Russia‘s best chance of countering the deployment of any ballistic
missile system. This paper will explore the issues that will turn Russia‘s reliance on
nuclear weapons from a ―stop gap‖ measure into a permanent policy.

3

CHAPTER TWO: GEOGRAPHY
Understanding Russia‘s geography is critical to understanding why the Russia
Federation is, and will continue to be, reliant on nuclear weapons for defense. Even if
Russian conventional forces were substantially better trained, equipped, and manned,
they would still have difficulty in protecting Russian territory against a foreign aggressor
in a major military conflict. Russia is too big and spread out for military forces to be
strong enough everywhere, and concentrating in one area leaves other regions exposed
and vulnerable. While Russian military districts have been reorganized to mitigate this
weakness, it still leaves thousands of kilometers of border to defend and monitor. Nuclear
weapons offer Russia‘s leader the best means by which to both deter an attack and win a
future conflict with an aggressor intent on attacking the Russian state on any front of the
entire Federation.
Russia‘s geography has long been both a blessing and a curse. A curse because it
fails to provide any significant defensive features and a blessing because the sheer size of
Russia makes it more than any foreign invader can hope to secure. Historically, the
leaders of Russia have consistently pushed outward in the hopes of securing territory and
geographic features that can act as defensive obstacles such as the Pripet Marshes and the
Caucasus and Carpathian Mountains. These features either allow for locations where
Russian military forces can be concentrated with natural defenses or allow its forces to be
diverted to routes more likely to be used by invaders. A byproduct of this expansion was
4

the acquisition of more territory that a potential adversary would have to conquer, and
secure, before reaching the political and economic centers of the Russian empire. The
size of the empire also provided Russian forces with plenty of strategic depth in which to
retreat in while any invader had to cross more and more territory which he had to secure
for ever increasing supply lines.
The Carpathian and the Caucasus mountain ranges are two of the defensive
features that Russian leaders have long strived to control, either directly or through
friendly regimes. Without control of these two mountain ranges, the interior of Russia is
vulnerable to attack. Steppes and plains lie to the north of the Caucasus and to the north
and east of the Carpathians in what is known as the European Plain. In the east, between
the Ural Mountains and the Caspian Sea lie more steppes (See Figure 1). This terrain
allowed for easy access to foreign invaders to attack the interior of the Russian empire.
Both Napoleon and Nazi Germany invaded Russia by means of the Northern Plains,
while the Mongols came across the steppes that stretch between the Urals and the
Caspian Sea.3
This constant vulnerability and history of invasion guides Russian geopolitics to
this day. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost control of the territory south
of the Caucasus Mountains to the three newly independent states of Georgia, Armenia,
and Azerbaijan. The loss of this buffer explains why Russia has been unwilling to
compromise and let go of Chechnya or any other republic along the Caucasus range: the
loss of them would deny Russia the natural defensive feature offered by these mountains
and leave a vulnerable gap in Russia‘s defensive line along its southern flank. Letting one
3

―The Geopolitics of Russia: Permanent Struggle,‖ Stratfor: Global Intelligence, October 15, 2008,
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081014_geopolitics_russia_permanent_struggle.
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Figure 1. ―The Geopolitics of Russia: Permanent Struggle,‖ Stratfor: Global Intelligence, October
15, 2008, http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20081014_geopolitics_russia_permanent_struggle.

or more of the republics go could trigger a chain reaction of independence movements
that could drive Russia out of the isthmus between the Black and the Caspian Seas
cutting off access to these bodies of water entirely. The loss of access to the Black Sea in
particular would be devastating to Russian prestige and national security. Also, there are
substantial fossil fuel deposits and pipelines in this region that Russia is unwilling to give
up.
The loss of control over Central Asia led to the emergence of five new republics.
Losing control over these territories denied the Russia Federation access to large resource

6

deposits and a substantial portion of its strategic depth in the region. Also, while not
ideal, Central Asia did provide some defensive geographic features such as the
Himalayan Mountains in the south and east, and the Kara Kum Desert in Turkmenistan in
the south. However, the loss of direct control over this region has not hurt Russia‘s
national security as much as initially believed. Most of the governments in the region are
still friendly towards Moscow and highly dependent on good relations with their former
master. Other than China, which Russia borders elsewhere anyway, Russia does not
currently face an adversary that could move through this region to attack from the south.
Today the Russian Federation encompasses over 6.5 million square miles,
stretches over 10 time zones, possesses a 43,500 mile long border, and another 23,620
miles of coast line.4 However, the Russian population hovers at just around 140 million.5
Together this amounts to an overwhelming amount of territory to defend. Up until the
end of World War II, Russia‘s ability to retreat, pursue a scorched earth policy, harass
extended supply lines, and overwhelm any invader with its territory had served it well.
However, the post-World War II era saw the advent of new weapons technologies such as
nuclear weapons, missiles, and long-range bombers which have minimized Russia‘s
geographic advantages. Since then, weapons have only become more sophisticated,
powerful, and accurate.
These advancements in weapons technology have offset or reduced many of the
advantages of Russia‘s geographic size. An adversary does not have to travel on foot or
vehicle across the entire front to threaten or attack Moscow, St. Petersburg, or the other
4

Milan V. Vego, ―Russia and the Return of Geopolitics,‖ Joint Forces Quarterly, 2007, 12.

5

―The World Factbook 2011 (Russia),‖ The World Factbook 2011 (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence
Agency, 2011), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rs.html.
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industrial and political centers of Russia. An adversary can now fly over defensive
emplacements or launch a missile to strike at a target without ever having to place troops
on the ground. Also, today, wars are more about achieving political objectives than
territorial gains. The combination of political objectives and war without ground forces
means that some of the advantages of Russia‘s geography are diminished. However,
Russia‘s size still protects it from any attempts to seriously occupy it and allows it to
disperse its military and industrial capabilities to make them less vulnerable.
Nevertheless, the large amount of territory necessary to defend will overwhelm the
current Russian military forces even if an attack only occurred along one front. With the
majority of its forces concentrated against a single foe, it would leave other regions of the
Russian state vulnerable to attack.
In some circumstances, even getting its forces to the enemy would be difficult.
―Russia‘s problem is that it is a vast country with relatively poor transportation.‖6
Transporting Russian forces to a remote zone such as a conflict in the Russian Far East
(RFE) or deep in Central Asia would take precious time and strain the logistical
capabilities of the Russian military. The RFE is especially vulnerable as it would be easy
for an adversary to cut the main infrastructure routes to the east, delaying a relief
response by ground forces.
If Russia were simultaneously attacked along its entire periphery, in spite of the
size of its forces, it would be unable to easily protect itself. It would have
difficulty mobilizing forces and deploying them to multiple fronts, so it would
have to maintain an extremely large standing army that could be pre-deployed.7

6

George Friedman, The Next 100 Years (New York: Anchor Books, 2009), 104.

7

Ibid.
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The economic and financial burden of such a large military force would likely collapse
the Russian state all over again.8 Depending on conventional forces limits the number of
fronts the Russians can fight on and, as will be described later, may be unable to
effectively counter an external threat.
Despite this scenario, the probability of an attack on the Russian Federation on
multiple fronts is unlikely to say the least but is a vulnerability that any state must
consider, especially one such as Russia with so much exposed border. While possible,
even Russia‘s leaders do not appear to consider the ―attack on all fronts‖ scenario all that
likely. However, they consider the chance of an attack on at least one of their fronts very
seriously as demonstrated by their military exercises. The exercises Zapad-99, Mobility
2004, and Stability 2008 all simulated an attack on the Russian Federation by outside
aggressors. Zapad and Stability both escalated into nuclear exchanges with NATO9 and
the West respectively.10
The Russian military has worked to improve its air mobility capabilities in an
attempt to overcome its poor infrastructure east of the Urals. In June 2004, the Russian
Armed Forces staged a military exercise codenamed ―Mobility 2004‖ which consisted of
transporting Russian military personnel and equipment from the western military district

8

Ibid.

9

Nikolai Sokov, Russian Ministry of Defense’s New Policy Paper: The Nuclear Angle (James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies, October 10, 2003), http://cns.miis.edu/reports/sok1003.htm.
10

Richard Weitz, ―Global Insights: Military Exercises Showcase Russian Power, and Its Limits,‖ World
Politics Review, October 14, 2008, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/2777/global-insightsmilitary-exercises-showcase-russian-power-and-its-limits.
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to the RFE.11 While the exercise was successful, even with this air capability, these
planes would be vulnerable to interdiction by enemy aircraft or mobile surface-to-air
weapons requiring their own escorts for protection. Therefore, Russia Armed Forces still
face major obstacles in deploying their forces to remote areas whereas nuclear weapons
do not face such problems.
Even with the advances in weapons technology, Russia‘s geographic size still
gives it the ability to spread out and decentralize its military forces and military industry,
and provide it plenty of places to hide facilities and stockpile weapons. The U.S. invasion
of Afghanistan in 2001and Iraq in 2003, demonstrated that instituting major political or
military change still requires the commitment of ground troops even with the
advancements in warfare. By comparison, the U.S. failed to achieve regime change in
Iraq in 1991or in Libya (as of May 2011) despite vigorous air campaigns in both
conflicts.
Any commitment of ground forces by an adversary today against Russia would
have the same consequences as in the past: large swaths of territory to secure, vulnerable
supply lines, and plenty of territory within which to retreat. Ultimately, the pros and cons
of Russia‘s territorial size will depend on the objectives of the adversary: is the purpose
to defeat Russian military forces or force a change in government within Russia?
Regardless of the attacker‘s objective, nuclear weapons provide an ideal answer to
how Russia‘s leaders can hope to defend such a ―virtually indefensible‖ state with so
much vulnerable coastline, porous borders, and limited number of military forces.12 First,

11

Roger McDermott, ―Russia Launches Large-scale Military Exercise,‖ Eurasia Daily Monitor 1, no. 36
(June 21, 2004), http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=29986.
12
Friedman, The Next 100 Years, 104.
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Russia‘s nuclear forces are still very capable and can be delivered by each of the nuclear
triad. Therefore, nuclear weapons will deter an adversary from believing that they can
attack or capture Russian territory without consequence, even if they believe themselves
capable of defeating Russia‘s conventional forces. Second, Russia's nuclear weapons can
be delivered anywhere in the world in less than an hour by means of ICBMs or SLBMs.
This means that whatever the status of Russia‘s conventional forces, Russia‘s leaders can
still retaliate against an adversary without having to invade them. Finally, the devastating
power of nuclear weapons far exceeds the destructive capability of conventional weapons
making any attack on Russian territory extremely costly.
The result is that the Russian leadership can successfully defend the full size of
the Russian Federation and maintain its territorial integrity through the use – or threat –
of nuclear weapons. Any adversary will have to take Russia‘s nuclear forces into
consideration if it ever plans to take action against the Russia state, even if it possess
limited goals and is not intent of threatening the survival of the Russian state. At this
time, the only way that Russia‘s leaders will be able to defend their territory from a
strong potential adversary, such as the United States, NATO, or China, is by maintaining
nuclear weapons as a deterrent. However, as will be explained below, currently the
Russia Federation does not face a serious outside threat, much less a threat of invasion by
an external force, which would require the Russian Federation to employ nuclear
weapons.

11

CHAPTER THREE: RUSSIA’S THREAT PERCEPTION
Russians have always had a strong sense of being under constant threat. One
reason for this is due to the geographic vulnerability of Russia state referenced above.
The other reason is because Russia has a long history of invasion. The Mongols, the
French, the Swedes, the Poles, and the Germans have all attacked or invaded Russia,
many of them on more than one occasion. Even during the Russian Civil War, the Whites
received support from foreign nations in their battle against the Reds. After World War
II, this feeling of vulnerability did not diminish as Soviet leaders saw the United States
establish a ring of military bases around the world and fostered relationships with anticommunist regimes around the Soviet Union in what became part of the U.S.‘s
containment policy. Finally, the collapse of the Soviet Union brought about internal
instability, cuts to military budgets, losses of territory, bases, and production facilities,
and many former satellite states rushed to be embraced by the West.

The NATO Threat
NATO, a military alliance specifically organized against the Soviet Union, was
established to Russia‘s west and has endured for over 60 years. Since the Soviet Union‘s
collapse this military bloc has expanded east and brought NATO troops and infrastructure
closer to the Russian border and major urban centers. As part of NATO, new member
states receive access to advanced military equipment and additional training to increase
12

their effectiveness and capabilities. This support is provided chiefly by the more powerful
member states – Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States – which
substantially improves the military capabilities of states along Russia‘s western border,
many of whom are less than friendly towards Russia. The membership of Estonia, Latvia,
and Lithuania are of particular concern as these were the first three former soviet states to
join NATO and all three share a direct border with the Russian Federation.
While expansion has slowed, the fact that at the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest
offers of extending membership to Ukraine and Georgia – two additional former soviet
states that border Russia – was openly discussed has done little to alleviate the Russian
fear that NATO poses a threat. Although the United States has since backed off under the
Obama Administration, the Russian leadership no doubt viewed this action as the U.S.‘s
and NATO‘s continued desire to expand the alliance closer to Russia.
Also, the post-WWII U.S. relationships and alliances established with South
Korea and Japan in Russia‘s Far East continue to endure to this day. Close U.S. relations
with (at the time) the Shah of Iran, the monarchy of Saudi Arabia, and the governments
of Israel, Pakistan and Turkey checked Soviet advances in the Middle East. Finally, even
China emerged as a threat to the Soviet Union and almost led to full-fledged conflict.
Although war was avoided, the Sino-Soviet split and China‘s eventual opening up to the
United States did not improve Russian leaders‘ sense of security.

Eastern Europe
The collapse of the Soviet Union and its subsequence breakup into numerous new
states only made matters worse for Russia‘s political and military leaders as the borders
13

of Russia were pushed back in the west and the south. The loss of Belarus, Estonia,
Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova and Ukraine dealt a heavy territorial blow as they lost a
significant portion of their strategic depth on the Western front and a number of these
states joined NATO and oriented themselves toward the West as much as possible.
The loss of Ukraine was especially devastating due to the importance it plays as a
transportation hub for the Russian Federation.
Ukraine is the transit point for 80 percent of all natural gas shipped from Russia to
Europe and is the connection point for most infrastructure – whether pipeline,
road, power or rail – running between Russia and the West.13
Ukraine‘s independence also cost Russia direct access to the Russian naval base at
Sevastopol in the Crimea. However, the recent election of pro-Russian President Viktor
Yanukovich in 2010 and a vote by the Ukraine parliament to extend Russia‘s lease of the
naval base by 25 years has secured Russian access to Sevastopol at least for the near
future.14 Ukraine also possesses a large ethnic Russian population and significant
industrial capability. Finally, from a cultural perspective, Ukraine is the birthplace of
Russian culture and civilization, Kievan Rus‘, and its independence only emphasizes
Russian weakness in the post-Cold War environment.

The Caucasus States
In the South along the Caucasus Mountains, the emergence of the newly
independent states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan pushed the Russian border back

13

―Russia‘s Expanding Influence, Part 1: The Necessities,‖ Stratfor: Global Intelligence, March 9, 2010,
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100304_russia_0.
14

―Parliamentary Chaos as Ukraine Ratifies Fleet Deal,‖ BBC News, April 27, 2010,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8645847.stm.
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to the very edge of the mountain range. In the past, this region acted as a territorial buffer
against Turkish power.15 Today it acts as a ―Christian buffer between Islamic influences
from the south and Russia‘s Muslim regions.‖16 The Caucasus Mountains represent one
of the few natural geographic defensive features the Russian state held onto following the
break of the USSR. This has made consolidating the states along the southern range of
the Caucasus‘s under Russia influence – either through carrots or coercion – a top
priority.
The rugged terrain makes defense relatively easy. However, should the Russians
lose their position the Caucasus altogether and be pushed north into the lowlands,
Russia‘s position would become difficult.17
The lowlands lead to the Russian steppe which facilitates a ground invasion of the Russia
heartland.
This is the reason the Russians are so unwilling to compromise on Chechnya. The
southern part of Chechnya is deep in the Northern Caucasus. If that were lost, the
entire Russian position [in the region] would unravel.18
The loss of the Caucuses states cut Russia off from the energy resources along the
Azerbaijani coast of the Caspian Sea. This has been to Russia‘s detriment as a number of
new energy pipelines have been constructed that traverse the Caucasus states and
intentionally avoid crossing into Russia territory. The result is a reduction in Russian
influence and control over energy resources being exported out of the Caspian Sea basin
and Central Asia.

15

Friedman, The Next 100 Years, 107.

16

―Russia‘s Expanding Influence, Part 1: The Necessities.‖

17

Friedman, The Next 100 Years, 107.

18

Ibid.
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Central Asia
The Central Asia Republics (CAR), while independent, do not pose a major
national security concern for Russia‘s leaders at this time. The five landlocked republics
are tightly bound to Russian and ―rely heavily on transportation, communications,
supply-chains, and other networks that either traverse Russia or fall under Moscow's
control.‖19 However, regardless of these ties, Russia‘s leaders must take action to ensure
these states stay in its orbit lest they seek closer ties with other nations or decide to
pursue more independent policies. To that end, ―Russian officials have also waged a
low-keyed but effective campaign to limit American, Chinese, and other foreign
economic competition in Central Asian countries.‖20 Of the five states, Kazakhstan is the
most important due to its size, economic power, and the fact that it is the only one of the
five that borders the Russian Federation. Kazakhstan is also very important because
―[w]homever controls Kazakhstan would be a hundred miles from the Volga, a river
highway for Russian agriculture‖ or a route for military invasion into the heartland of
western Russia.21 Much like the Mississippi River in the United States, control over the
Volga provides access to the interior of the Russian state. If Kazakhstan were to become
hostile to Russia or allied with a potential adversary, such as China, it would force the
Russian military to take action to ensure control of the Volga River or risk it falling into
enemy hands.

19

Richard Weitz, ―Strategic Posture Review: Russia,‖ World Politics Review (February 1, 2009),
http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/5065/strategic-posture-review-russia.
20

Ibid.

21

Friedman, The Next 100 Years, 109.
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At this time Kazakhstan is likely to remain in Russia‘s orbit but China has been
increasing ties with many of the CAR especially Kazakhstan. The two share a 1,500 km
border and China has increased political and economic ties with all of the CAR.22 ―Trade
between China and the five Central Asian countries totaled $25.9 billion in 2009, up from
$527 million in 1992, according to Commerce Ministry statistics.‖23 Chinese consumer
goods such as ―clothing, electronics and household appliances…have lately flooded
Central Asia.‖24 China has also invested in the region to access its energy resources,
―[t]wo new pipelines…supply [China] with gas from Turkmenistan and oil from
Kazakhstan.‖25

China
Finally, Russia‘s relationship with China poses a major dilemma for its leaders.
―Since the late 1980s, China and Russia have expanded their bilateral economic and
security cooperation to unprecedented levels.‖26 While diplomatic relations have
substantially improved since the Sino-Soviet split, Russia has yet to conclude whether
China is a future threat or ally. Both states have followed similar authoritarian
government paths and oppose U.S. unipolarity and unilateral action, however, China‘s
22

―The World Factbook 2011 (Kazakhstan),‖ The World Factbook 2011 (Washington, DC: Central
Intelligence Agency, 2011), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/kz.html.
23

Edward Wong, ―China Quietly Extends Footprints Into Central Asia,‖ New York Times (New York,
January 2, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/03/world/asia/03china.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2&sq=china,%20kazakh
stan&st=cse&scp=1.
24

Ibid.

25

Ibid.

26

Weitz, ―Strategic Posture Review: Russia.‖
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growing economic power, military expansion, and growing demand for raw materials
could threaten Russia‘s Far East or even lead to a conflict.
Russian territory east of the Urals contains a population of only seven million
ethnic Russians which continues to decrease as more Russia‘s migrate west.27
Meanwhile,
roughly six hundred thousand illegal Chinese migrants a year are pouring
northward into Russia‘s depopulated Far East – a number almost identical to
Russia‘ annual population decline.…China‘s northeastern provinces alone have a
total population of over one hundred million.…
Russia‘s virgin Far East also contains massive deposits of zinc, nickel, tin,
diamonds, and gold, as well as vast fisheries and timber forests – all of which are
attractive to the world‘s largest importer of raw materials.28
Russia‘s leaders find themselves in a difficult position as China has developed the region
in a way that Russia cannot.29 Chinese investment in the region allows for extraction of
natural resources and the development of infrastructure while also providing jobs for
local residents and supplying cheap Chinese consumer goods. However, as more ethnic
Russians leave and legal and illegal Chinese immigrants flood the region, Russia‘s
leaders fear a silent Chinese takeover.
Chinese citizens…visit Chinese-operated health clinics, and Chinese men even
marry Siberian women, whose husbands are either perpetually drunk or already
dead as a consequence.30
In another generation, the Russian Far East may be ―Russian‖ in name only.
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China‘s military expansion is another concern for Russia‘s leaders as the pace and
scale of Chinese modernization and professionalization of its armed forces has grown.
Since the two governments signed an agreement on military-technical cooperation
in December 1992, China has purchased more defense items from the Russian
Federation than from all other countries combined.31
However,
now that the Chinese defense industry has become capable of producing more
sophisticated armaments, Moscow confronts the uncomfortable choice of either
seeing its Chinese market decrease dramatically or agreeing to sell even more
advanced weapons to Beijing, a decision that could destabilize military force
balances in East Asia…32
to Russia‘s disfavor.
The Chinese are currently investing heavily in a blue-water navy that is meant to
include several aircraft carriers. Recent developments like the unveiling of the J-20,
China‘s newest domestically produced ―stealth fighter,‖ the new ―carrier-killing‖ antiship ballistic missile, and the 2007 successful test of an anti-satellite missile all indicate
that China is taking its military modernization seriously. At least for now, China‘s
military interests seem to be oriented toward Taiwan, the United States, and the South
East Asian region. However, the Chinese military exercise of 2009, codenamed Kuayue
(Stride), dealt with the PLA‘s ability to rapidly move forces from across China. This
included moving troops from the China‘s far west military region, Lanzhou, to its
northeast military region, Shenyang, which borders Russia‘s Far East.33 While it does not
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appear that China has any intention to increase tensions with its Russian neighbor any
time soon, Russia‘s leaders view the future with growing concern.
In the newest Russian Military Doctrine, territorial claims against the Russian
Federation are explicitly listed as potential external threats. Between 1858 and 1860, the
Russian Empire annexed previously held Chinese territories along the Amur River that
are equal in size to that of France and Germany combined.34 The Russian Federation‘s
concern is that with the shift in economic and military power between the two countries
in the RFE and the changing demographic situation in the region may provide the
Chinese with additional justification with which to press their claims to territory that once
belonged to them.

Threats Everywhere
The Russian Federation seriously views a potential threat from NATO on its
western border, the potential for invasion or attack along its southern flank in the
Caucasus or Central Asia, and a threat to its Far East territories from China. If Russia‘s
political and military leaders believe that an attack could come from any one (or
combination) of these areas then they must also conclude that they currently lack the
conventional military assets to effectively defend against such an attack. The only
Russian force currently capable of deterring or defeating a major attack against the
Russian Federation is the nuclear weapons in its arsenal. A report produced in 2004 by
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the Ministry Defense, the Immediate Tasks of Development of the Armed Forces of the
Russian Federation,
implicitly suggests that Russia cannot face a militarily advanced state [i.e. the
United States or China] or a coalition of states [i.e. NATO] without engaging its
nuclear capability‖
due to the current weakness of conventional forces.35 This conclusion has been
demonstrated by the Russian military exercises, Zapad-99 and Stability 2008, which both
ended in a Russian ―victory‖ only after it escalated into a nuclear exchange. The Russian
nuclear triad makes ICBMs employable on all potential fronts and allows them to be used
against the attacking forces and to target the state(s) that initiated the attack against the
Russian Federation. Except for the strategic bombers, these weapons could be launched
against an attack force and hit their target in less than an hour. No other weapon in the
current Russian arsenal allows for Russia‘s military forces to respond against an attacking
force or state with such speed and devastation.

Faulty Perception
Despite all these perceived vulnerabilities to the Russian Federation, it is difficult
to understand why the Russians believe that any state would be willing to attack the
Russian Federation and risk a nuclear response. The fact is that Russia today and in the
near-future faces a rather mild threat environment when it comes to external threats to the
existence of the Russian Federation. Threats to Russia‘s territorial integrity or existence
are more likely to come from internal forces such as terrorist groups or insurgencies like
those found in Chechnya and the rest of the Caucasus. These are threats for which nuclear
35
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weapons are impracticable, infeasible, and ultimately ineffective. Nuclear weapons
represent the ultimate broadsword at a time when what Russia‘s national security
establishment needs is a scalpel with which to selectively target terrorist cells, insurgent
groups, secessionists, and anti-government movements hiding amidst the domestic
population.
Russia‘s current possession of nuclear weapons alone deters the chance of any
state – nuclear or non-nuclear – attempting to engage in a conflict with the Russian
Federation. Although a Great Powers conflict is always possible and Russia‘s military
must to be prepared for its eventuality as any nation does, its likelihood in the current
global environment is low. Even the 2010 Russia Military Doctrine admits a ―decline in
the likelihood of large-scale war involving the use of conventional means of attack and
nuclear weapons being unleashed against the Russian Federation.‖36 The United States is
exhausted from war and still focused on its operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The
United States is unlikely to seek out any new military conflicts, particularly with a
nuclear power such as Russia whose cooperation it needs to pursue other foreign policy
objectives such as stabilizing Afghanistan, arms control, resolving the Iranian and North
Korean nuclear issues, and engaging in international counternarcotics and
counterterrorism efforts.
Russia‘s leaders have a valid concern about the expansion of military alliances
such as NATO, that it is not a member of, closer to its border that could place potentially
hostile assets closer to its territory and constrain Russian foreign and military policy
objectives. This concern may be due to the expanding role of NATO based on the
36
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Alliance‘s decision to become involved in Afghanistan. However, this must be viewed in
some context. NATO became involved in Afghanistan because it invoked Article 5 of the
NATO Charter for the first time in its history after a major provocation against one of its
founding members on the morning of September 11, 2001 which resulted in almost threethousand civilian casualties by terrorist extremists. The Russian Federation would have to
be prepared to commit a similar provocation, such as an attack on a current NATO
member state, to warrant a NATO attack. Russia‘s leaders would also have to assume that
NATO would be willing to risk a nuclear confrontation if it decided to engage in military
action against the Russian Federation, and there is no indication that any NATO member
has the desire to raise the stakes to that of a nuclear war.
Russia‘s leaders should also look to recent developments regarding the NATO
alliance. NATO‘s operations in Afghanistan have exposed the difficulties the alliance
faces in its ability to mobilize and supply soldiers and military equipment outside the
European theater for sustained operations and public opinion in many NATO states has
turned decidedly against the Afghanistan conflict. As with the United States, a sense of
war fatigue has set in that will likely prevent NATO from seeking out a military
confrontation that would require the deployment of substantial assets including ground
forces in the near future. The fact that certain NATO members resisted additional
expansion during the 2008 NATO Bucharest summit should be a sign to Russia‘s leaders
that even the European states feel that there should be limits on NATO expansion when it
comes to Russian interests. Finally, Russian ties with certain European states have
improved as witnessed by the negotiations to purchase as many as four $700 million
French Mistral-class amphibious assault ships, an advanced piece of military
23

technology;37 the completion of Nord Stream pipeline project that delivers 47 percent of
natural gas directly to Germany; and the recent thaw in relations between Russia and
Poland following the change in Polish government in 2007 and the April 2010 plane
crash that killed a number of high ranking Polish government officials including the
Polish President.38
Meanwhile, Russo-Chinese relations are the best they have been in years with
China representing one of Russia‘s major trading partners.39 Although Russia‘s leaders
may view a potential threat to Russia‘s Far East from Chinese encroachment over the
long-term, so long as China does not make an overt claim or attempt to annex the RFE
Russia‘s leaders are unlikely to increase tensions in the region. In the meantime, they will
benefit from Chinese investment and development in the region and profit from the
revenues derived from resource exports.
China‘s military expansion and modernization is also oriented more toward South
East Asia and at potentially pushing out, or at least minimizing, the U.S. presence in the
South Pacific. China‘s planned expansion of its navy, its increasingly aggressive behavior
toward its neighbors and willingness to throw its economic and military weight around,
and its continued preoccupation with reasserting control over Taiwan indicate that
China‘s military ambitions and interests will be more directed toward its south-eastern
neighbors and the United States rather than against Russia.
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Finally, while China may pose a threat to Russia‘s Far East, it does not threaten
Russia‘s existence. The reason that it would be difficult for Russia to reinforce the RFE
in the event of a conflict – long distance, difficult Siberian terrain, and lack of adequate
transportation infrastructure – is the same reason that a ground attack by PLA forces
aimed at western Russia would fail: the vast wilderness of Siberia is a defense all its
own.40 Also, both states are nuclear powers which in-and-of-itself is a major deterrent
factor, but in this respect Russia has a decided advantage over the Chinese numerically in
terms of actual nuclear weapons and fifty years worth of Cold War experience where
nuclear war was a real and potential threat. China has approximately 240 nuclear
weapons in its inventory, compared to Russia‘s 11,000.41 Of these it is believed that no
more than
20 [are] operational intercontinental ballistic missiles -- each carrying a single
warhead.…The U.S. intelligence community anticipates that, at best, China will
be able to increase this number to 100 warheads by 2015.42
Compare this to Russia‘s
667 strategic delivery platforms capable of carrying approximately 3,000 nuclear
warheads. Most of these are land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) under the command of the Strategic Missile Forces (SMF). The Russian
Navy also has long-range ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads based on
its 14 strategic missile submarines, while the Russian Air Force has 79 strategic
bombers armed with as many as 884 long-range cruise missiles as well as gravity
bombs.43
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Ballistic Missile Defense
Another variable that factors into Russia‘s threat perception and reliance on
nuclear weapons will be the United State‘s development and deployment of an antiballistic missile (ABM) defense system. The U.S. decision to pursue this technology has
raised major fears in the Russian military that these platforms are specifically targeted
against Russian nuclear capabilities despite U.S. claims to the contrary. While the
capacity of this technology is improving, at this time it is nowhere near as capable as
some might fear. An ABM system must be close to 100 percent effective to make it a
viable defensive weapon which is extremely difficult to achieve. However, Russia‘s
leaders have to contend with the possibility that increased investment and testing will
eventually yield a relatively reliable ABM system able to target tactical and strategic
nuclear missiles during any one of the three launch phases (boost, mid-course, terminal).
If the United States is able to successfully perfect this technology then it would
have the potential to compromise Russia‘s nuclear deterrence capability. Also, it would
eliminate the Russian Federation‘s last surefire means of defending against an attack on
its territory. If the United States can defend itself from incoming ICBMs (and this
technology were to be shared with NATO countries) and it already maintains a
conventional advantage over Russian forces, then Russia‘s actual and perceived
vulnerability to attack increases substantially.
The simplest and most effective means of countering an ABM system is to
overwhelm it. First, Russian nuclear weapons have carried decoys and penetration aids
for decades, long before the United States began to invest heavily in ABM systems. This
ensures that warheads on their terminal approach will have a greater chance of confusing
26

ABM systems and surviving to hit their targets. However, U.S. ABM systems will
eventually target missile during their initial boost phase before the warheads separate
from the missile. Therefore, the Russian Federation may have to compensate also with
more nuclear missiles. Firing off more missiles than can possibly be intercepted during
the boost phase and having each missile carry multiple warheads ensures that even if a
large percentage of missiles are knocked out by the ABM system, enough warheads will
still reach their targets to devastate the enemy. Therefore, any potential attack on the
Russian Federation would continue to remain too costly.
The U.S. plans for the deployment of the ABM system under the Phase Adaptive
Approach currently include targeting nuclear missiles during their mid-course and
terminal phase. An ABM system for targeting missiles during their initial boost phase
was in development but has recently been cancelled.44 However, it should be assumed
that research will continue into such a system and that it will eventually become part of
the U.S.‘s ABM shield. The result is that if the Russian Federation wishes to maintain an
effective nuclear deterrent that can penetrate or survive an ABM system, then they will
have to maintain or increase the number of launch vehicles and warheads per missile.
This will minimize the effectiveness of any ABM by requiring an ever increasing number
of interceptors and a high interception rate.
However, such an attempt to counter an ABM system will eventually reach a limit
due to the constraints outline in the New START treaty signed by the United States and
the Russia Federation in 2010. The new treaty limits both sides to no more than 1,550
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deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed strategic delivery systems (air, sea, and
land based).45 Instead of being concerned with a ceiling on warheads and vehicles, the
Russian Federation may become more focused on the floor number of vehicles and
warheads that it cannot cross below without imperiling its nuclear deterrent capability in
respect to a missile defense system. If the United States is unable to reach an agreement
with the Russian Federation regarding its missile defense program, then Russia may have
no choice but to either cease reductions or even withdrawal from current treaties to
increase their nuclear forces in an attempt to maintain enough weapons to overwhelm any
missile defense system and ensure Russian deterrent capability. The fewer number of
deployable strategic warheads and vehicles allowed under the current treaty in
conjunction with the current weakness of Russia‘s conventional forces will place Russia
at a severe disadvantage. When considering this alongside U.S. missile defense systems
that may neutralize or minimize Russian nuclear deterrent capacity it is no wonder that
the Russian feel vulnerable.
U.S. efforts to develop and deploy a missile defense system provide an additional
reason why the Russian Federation will become increasingly dependent on nuclear
weapons for its national security. As the U.S. system becomes more effective and is
increasingly deployed, Russia‘s leaders will have to determine whether they currently
maintain enough strategic vehicles and warheads that can penetrate a missile defense to
reach their targets thereby ensuring a Russian nuclear deterrent capability. Depending on
how effective they perceive the U.S. missile defense to be, they may conclude that they
must increase the number of vehicles and/or warheads per missile to maintain a deterrent
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capacity. Even if Russian conventional forces were to improve substantially in the future
they could not protect Russia from a nuclear attack. A nuclear attack can only be deterred
with a nuclear response of equal or greater destruction. Therefore, the Russian leadership
would feel that it has no choice other than to increase the deployment of nuclear vehicles
and warheads.

Perception versus Reality
The conclusions that can be drawn in this section are that the leaders of the
Russian Federation perceive an international environment that emphasizes external
military threats to the Federation‘s existence. Based on Russia‘s geographic
vulnerabilities and history of invasion, Russia‘s threat perception is not entirely
misplaced. However, from a Western perspective, it appears to be greatly exaggerated
when it comes to the possible threats posed by NATO, China, or the United States. These
three realize that the Russian Federation‘s nuclear forces are still powerful and capable
weapons, and even an ill-equipped and under-trained conventional military of one million
men can inflict a significant amount of damage. NATO, China, nor the United States has
any intention of becoming engaged in a conventional or nuclear armed conflict with the
Russian Federation, however Russian analysis of the threat environment appear to
specifically point toward such a likelihood. However, it is important to understand that
the ―threat does not have to be real; perception of a threat can be equally powerful
(emphasis added).‖46
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The fact remains that external threats dominate Russia‘s current threat perception,
whether outsiders consider them to be right or wrong, realistic or not. So long as Russia‘s
leaders believe that they are geographically vulnerable, susceptible to invasion by
external forces, and do not consider their conventional military forces capable of
deterring or repelling an attack on the Russian Federation, then it makes sense for them to
adopt a policy that promotes nuclear weapons which increases their reliance on them.
Nuclear weapons provide a credible deterrent against attack, compensate for Russia‘s
vulnerable geographic position and currently weak conventional forces, allow for
devastating retaliation, can be used in a timely manner, and can be employed anywhere
along Russia‘s periphery (or in the world for that matter). Russia‘s conventional military
forces cannot fulfill all these functions without a massive investment in modernization,
training, and expansion of force that still could not guarantee to provide all the benefits of
nuclear weapons and are beyond Russia‘s current capability to fund and man without
ruinous sacrifices in other areas.
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CHAPTER FOUR: RUSSIAN MILITARY DOCTRINE
The 2000 and 2010 releases of Russia‘s military doctrine provide analysts with a
view of the major issues, priorities, and policies of the Russian Federation. In particular,
they allow the United States and other states to understand current Russian policies and
anticipate future actions. One of the most beneficial points of order identified by these
documents is the conditions under which the Russian Federation would employ nuclear
weapons. The second is the articulation of the specific threats that the Russian state views
toward itself and its allies. Finally, a close analysis of Russia‘s military doctrine indicates
that the Russian Federation is already leaning toward favoring nuclear weapons.
The 2010 Russian Military Doctrine (RMD), like the 2000 version, identifies and
outlines four types of potential conflicts:
armed conflict (basically, a small-scale clash between two states or within one
state similar to the war in Chechnya);
local war (war with limited goals that affects only the interests of the
immediate participants — a good example is the 2008 Russian-Georgian war);
regional war (war that involves significant forces, including naval and
airspace, which affects a large region and perhaps even coalitions of states);
and
large-scale war (war with radical, far-reaching goals that involves all or most
great powers; fundamentally, a new world war).47
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Point sixteen of the RMD 2010 version explicitly states that nuclear weapons could
potentially be employed in the latter two scenarios48 and that a ―conventional regional
war could escalate to the nuclear level.‖49 In addition, the
Russian Federation reserves the right to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the
utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it
and/or its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation
involving the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is
under threat [emphasis added].50
This language tightens the conditions under which nuclear weapons may be used. The
2000 version of the RMD allowed for the use of nuclear weapons ―in situations critical
for [the] national security of Russia…‖ a phrase open to interpretation.51 However, the
2010 RMD still represents an expansion of the role of nuclear weapons which was
limited only to global war by the 1993 RMD.52 Finally, the fact that the 2010 version
includes an allowance for the employment of nuclear weapons in response to a
conventional attack means that unofficially the Russian Federation maintains a first-use
policy, albeit under a strict condition.53 However, even the phrase ―when the existence of
the state is under threat‖ can be open to interpretation and depend on whoever happens to
be the President of Russia at the time and how they choose to interpret this phrase.
Although these are the conditions under which nuclear weapons may be
employed, according to the RMD, the primarily purpose of nuclear weapons is to prevent
48
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―the outbreak of nuclear military conflicts and military conflicts involving the use of
conventional means of attack [a large-scale war or regional war].‖54 However,
policymakers should take note of the fact that since 1993 the Russian Federation has
implicitly adopted a first-use policy and altered the conditions under which they would
utilize nuclear weapons. By the time the next military doctrine document is issued, the
conditions under which nuclear weapons could be utilized could once again be expanded
with corresponding language that is easily open to interpretation for the explicit purpose
of lowering the threshold for the utilization of nuclear weapons. This may become
especially pertinent should the planned modernization of conventional forces fail to come
about or advance far enough; if the political environment along the periphery of the
Russian Federation becomes more volatile; or if the threat perception of the Russian
Federation increases substantially.
Many of the main external military dangers listed explicitly identify NATO and
vaguely the United States and China as the main potential adversaries. The 2010 Russian
Military Doctrine lists the following as the primary external military dangers facing the
Russian Federation:

a) the desire to endow the force potential of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) with global functions carried out in violation of the norms
of international law and to move the military infrastructure of NATO member
countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by expanding
the bloc;
b) the attempts to destabilize the situation in individual states and regions and to
undermine strategic stability;
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c) the deployment (buildup) of troop contingents of foreign states (groups of
states) on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its
allies and also in adjacent waters;
d) the creation and deployment of strategic missile defence systems undermining
global stability and violating the established correlation of forces in the nuclearmissile sphere, and also the militarization of outer space and the deployment of
strategic nonnuclear precision weapon systems;
e) territorial claims against the Russian Federation and its allies and interference
in their internal affairs;
f) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and missile
technologies, and the increase in the number of states possessing nuclear
weapons;
g) the violation of international accords by individual states, and also
noncompliance with previously concluded international treaties in the field of
arms limitation and reduction;
h) the use of military force on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian
Federation in violation of the UN Charter and other norms of international law;
i) the presence (emergence) of seats of armed conflict and the escalation of such
conflicts on the territories of states contiguous with the Russian Federation and its
allies;
j) the spread of international terrorism;
k) the emergence of seats of interethnic (interfaith) tension, the activity of
international armed radical groupings in areas adjacent to the state border of the
Russian Federation and the borders of its allies, the presence of territorial
contradictions and the growth of separatism and violent (religious) extremism in
individual parts of the world.55
NATO is listed as the first of eleven ―main external dangers‖ yet it refers only to
NATO expansion and its willingness to operate outside the European theater instead of
couching it as a direct threat to the national security of the Russian Federation. This may
have been meant to prevent an escalation of tensions between Russia and NATO;
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however, the significance of NATO‘s listing as the first ―main danger‖ should not be
ignored. The 2000 Russian National Security Concept cited NATO as a threat to the
Russian Federation as well, specifically addressing its eastward expansion and its
undertaking of operations ―outside its zone of responsibility and without UN Security
Council sanction.‖56 Also, included was reference to the ―possible emergence of foreign
military bases and major military presences in immediate proximity of Russian
borders.‖57 This is likely a subtle reference to the establishment of NATO infrastructure
in new member states, primarily in Eastern Europe and U.S. military bases in
Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics in support of the U.S. operations there.
In addition, of the eleven external threats in the RMD 2010, NATO is the only
one that is explicitly identified, all of the other bullets refer to generalized threats (i.e.
terrorism, weapons proliferation, etc.) even when it is obvious which state(s) may be the
target of the bullet point. Bullet D, for example, specifically refers to the threat posed by
the development of strategic missile defense system which is currently only being
seriously pursed by the United States of America with its European allies. Point E refers
to territorial claims against the Russian Federation which most likely is a reference
toward China, which may lay a claim to territory in Russia‘s Far East that once belonged
to the Chinese Emperors.58 The other main territorial claim that the RF has to fear is the
dispute with Japan over the status of the South Kuril Islands aka the Northern
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Territories.59 However, neither country is referred to by name. Therefore, the explicit
mentioning of NATO and its listing as the first of eleven external threats may be
symbolic and indicate that Russia‘s leadership feels threatened by more than just NATO
expansion and its global operations.
Russia‘s leaders may not be able to view NATO as anything other than a threat.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia lost a substantial portion of its
strategic depth along its western border, a direction from which many invasions have
come. The loss of Belarus and Ukraine in particular pushed the Russian border back to
what it was during the 17th century. The collapse of the communist regimes in the
former-satellite states gave rise to states that were more often than not decidedly antiRussian and sought closer ties with the West. Soon after, a number of these states were
permitted to join the NATO alliance which placed these countries under NATO
protection and provided them with the other benefits associated with membership.
Increased NATO expansion east established alliance troops and infrastructure
closer to the Russian border and closer to the major urban and industrial regions of
internal Russia placing them at risk. While NATO has never indicated that it has any
intent to attack Russia – point 33 of NATO‘s 2010 Strategic Concept explicitly states
―NATO poses no threat to Russia. [emphasis added]‖60 – and the fact that it is an
inherently defensive organization, Russia‘s leaders had to realize that if it chose to,
NATO could pose a major challenge in the event of a military conflict. This can be seen
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by the common reference to ―groups of states‖ in Russian military documents when
referencing external threats. References regarding concern over military modernization
and the ―growing technical advantage of a number of leading powers‖ are also commonly
cited along with the need to overcome it.61 These leading powers are likely Germany,
France, the United Kingdom, and the United States, all core NATO members.
When considering the information regarding conditions under which the Russian
Federation would consider employing nuclear weapons; the specific external threats it
identifies; and certain references throughout the rest of the 2010 Russian Military
Doctrine; it becomes clear that Russia‘s leadership still believes that nuclear weapons
fulfill a critical function in Russian national security. While Russia‘s leaders hope that
this increased role is only temporary until its conventional forces can recover, as was the
case during the 1990s, in all likelihood the looser restrictions for nuclear weapons are
here to stay and whether Russians realize it or not, many of the external threats they
articulate can most easily be defeated or deterred by its nuclear arsenal.62 This fact only
increases the appeal of nuclear weapons.
Although Russia‘s conventional forces are not powerless by any means, they are
much weaker and less effective in the 21st century. Russia‘s conventional military,
particularly its ground forces, are plagued by low morale, weak leadership and training,
and outdated equipment. In addition, the Russian military primarily depends on a
conscript force whose period of service has been reduced to a mere 12 months. This short
service period makes for ill-trained and ill-prepared soldiers. The weakness of Russia‘s
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conventional forces was highlighted by the recent war with Georgia in 2008. This
included the inability of the Russian Air Force to establish air superiority during the
conflict, the loss of several air force jets to Georgian air defense, and the inability to
employ precision-guided munitions during the conflict.
The general consensus by Russian and foreign experts is that Russia‘s
conventional military forces are inherently weak and unprepared for a 21st century
conflict. They may be able to confront and defeat any of the Former Soviet Union (FSU)
states with limited difficulty in isolation or even in combination, but at this time would be
at a major disadvantage against the conventional forces of major military powers such as
China, Germany, or the United States even in isolation. If conventional forces are unable
to effectively discharge their responsibilities and cannot confront the external threats
outlined, then nuclear weapons become the only effective means of deterring and
defeating some of the external threats outlined in the RMD. Since Russia‘s leaders are
aware of the fact that their conventional military forces fall short in many areas they must
also realize that the only available option then becomes a greater reliance on nuclear
weapons.
Whether intentional or not, many of the external threats listed in the 2010 RMD
are directly related to Russia‘s nuclear capability. Bullet D refers to the deployment of
missile defense systems and bullet F refers to nuclear proliferation and the increase in
potential nuclear weapons states. The rise of these two concerns would diminish Russia‘s
nuclear trump card. The deployment of an effective missile defense system could
minimize the effectiveness of a nuclear attack, requiring more missile launches per target
to increase the probability of penetrating a missile defense system, or potentially render
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nuclear weapons obsolete if the system is effective enough. Meanwhile, an increase in the
number of states that possess nuclear weapons would increase the amount of damage
such a state could inflict on Russia if it decided to attack or counter-attack. In addition,
nuclear weapons proliferation would constrain Russia‘s military options unless it wanted
to risk a nuclear conflict, even one of limited proportions.
Russia‘s concerns about NATO and territorial claims against the Russian
Federation, bullets A and E respectively, are two external threats that nuclear weapons
are ideal solutions for. Should a threat emerge regarding either of these bullets, then
nuclear weapons provide an effective deterrent or means of retaliation should
conventional forces fail in this endeavor. However, it should be stressed that at this time
there does not appear to be any direct threat posed by NATO to the Russian Federation,
regardless of what may be written in the 2010 RMD. Also, the only substantial territorial
claims that may be of concern for the Russian Federation are in the RFE with China and
Japan. China does not want to engage in any kind of military conflict with Russia because
it would be counterproductive to its own goals at this time and because Russia is a
nuclear power. Also, Japan does not wish to engage in a military conflict with Russia
either and is prevented from resolving it through military force due to its pacifist
constitution.
The Russia Federation appears to have intentionally outlined potential external
threats that it must know that it cannot at this time easily defend against using its
conventional forces. Russia‘s concerns about NATO, deployment of missile defense
systems, territorial claims against it, and the increase in states possessing nuclear
weapons all are related to Russia‘s reliance on nuclear weapons and either threaten them
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or require their usage. Bullet C refers to the deployment of potentially hostile troops
along Russia‘s periphery. Once again, if these foreign troops pose a threat and if all other
avenues fail to remove their presence then it will be up to the conventional military forces
to deal with this threat if it cannot be resolved diplomatically. If Russian conventional
military are unable to handle the situation then nuclear weapons may have to be used (or
threaten their use) to deter, defeat, or force a retreat of the threat. With the current state of
Russia‘s conventional forces and the outlined external threats Russia‘s leaders feel they
face, the Russian Federation is intentionally moving itself toward a reliance on nuclear
weapons because it will be the only means by which it can face these perceived threats.
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CHAPTER FIVE: RUSSIA’S POPULATION PROBLEMS
One of the reasons why the Russian Federation will become increasingly
dependent on nuclear weapons for national security is because of its inability to draw
upon enough individuals to fill the ranks of its armed forces. In addition to its geographic
size, Russia has always depended heavily on its large population.
Indeed, manpower has traditionally been seen as an almost limitless resource,
often providing Russia the means to overcome shortcomings in other areas such
as technology, strategy, or professional military experience.63
However, over the next few decades, Russia‘s ability to do so will diminish as numerous
social factors begin to affect both the Russian military and civilian population. The
spread of numerous infectious diseases, external causes of death, low fertility rates, high
mortality, the legacy of poor health care services, lack of funding for health
infrastructure, and overall poor health of the general population are leading to the decline
of the Russian people. As the health of the domestic population diminishes, it impacts the
state‘s ability to recruit healthy soldiers by decreasing the pool of eligible candidates able
to serve in the military. It also increases the burden on the state by increasing the demand
for healthcare services and on the economy as there are fewer individuals able to enter
the workforce. The numerous social problems facing the Russian Federation will be
explored below; however, this should not be considered an exhaustive list.
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Declining Birth Rates
The Russian Federation faces a fundamental problem when it analyzes its
population: every year more people die than are born. While the Russian Federation is
not the only European state to suffer from a negative population growth rate, its negative
growth in one of the highest at -0.47.64 Out of the 233 countries listed on the CIA‘s
World Factbook for annual Population Growth Rate, Russia ranks 222. Also, World
Factbook‘s population estimate lists Russia‘s population as one of the lowest having
already dropped below 140 million.65
Russia‘s leaders are fully aware of the population decline and in 2000, thenPresident Vladimir Putin listed population decline as the first out of sixteen acute
problems facing the country.66 Russia‘s population is decreasing by as much as 750,000
every year, primarily due to the excess of deaths over births.67 This is about the number
of new conscripts that must be recruited every year by the Russian Armed Forces to
maintain a size of 1.1 million.68As of 2005, male births already equal the number of
individuals that currently need to be conscripted every year. However, not all males
survive until their draft year (minimum 18 years of age) and even then not all males are
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eligible for service. Therefore, at this time not enough males are born within the Russian
Federation to meet the current recruitment quotas eighteen years down the road. If births
continue to decline as they have in the past, then the pool of eligible candidates will only
become smaller making it impossible for the Russian Armed forces to maintain a million
man army under 12 month contracts.
There are a number of factors for the low birth rate. The primary amongst them is
the low fertility rate. Russia currently has a fertility rate of 1.4 children born per woman69
but would require 2.1 to simply meet the natural replacement rate.70 Russia would need
almost a doubling of the fertility rate just to maintain its current population levels;
however, this is not expected anytime soon despite the limited efforts to boost fertility.
This low fertility rate is compounded by the fact that two-thirds of all births in Russia are
born by females in the prime childbearing age group of 20 to 29, and this specific age
group is estimated to decline over the next two decades.71 In addition, ―fifteen to 20
percent of all Russian families experience infertility, with 10 to 15 percent of females
infertile, and some 5 to 10 percent of males.‖72 Infertility is exacerbated amongst women
since ―two-thirds of all pregnancies now end in abortions.‖73 In 2008, there were 1.2
million abortions compared to 1.7 million births making abortions and births almost
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equal.74 It should be noted that the recorded number of abortions may in fact be higher as
some of them take place in private or illegal clinics from which statistics are
unavailable.75 Of the 1.2 million women who undergo an abortion,
30,000 of them become sterile, many from the estimated 180,000 illegal
abortions…[and]…[a] quarter of deaths among pregnant women are the result of
illegal abortions.76
The rate of illegal abortions is unlikely to change any time soon as few cases of illegal
abortion are ever investigated and even fewer are ever prosecuted.77 The low fertility and
high abortion rate are heavily influenced by the current economic situation in Russia.
―According to a study published in late June 2001…30 percent of young females do not
wish to have children because of the economic hardships they confront.‖78 The current
rate of infertility and abortions are robbing the Russian Federation of over a million births
every year and are continually reducing the number of women able to bear children.

Amalgamate of Health Issues
HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis (TB) are just two of the major infectious diseases
culling the Russian population. While these and other diseases differ in the ways they kill
their victims and are spread and treated in different ways, they often affect the same highrisk groups and co-infections are common. Analysis of infectious diseases must also
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include illicit intravenous drug use as this is a common means by which disease is spread
and drug users represent one of the primary high-risk groups. However, the importance of
high-risk groups is beginning to diminish, especially in regards to illicit drug users, as
diseases such as HIV/AIDS are becoming more generalized amongst the Russian
population. Intravenous drug use, high rates of co-infections, and poor testing and record
keeping make it extremely difficult to establish a clear picture of the health issues facing
the Russian Federation. This does not even include intentional attempts by local or
central government officials to adjust the data, for political reasons, to present a more
favorable picture for domestic or international audiences.
In particular, high rates of co-infection often mean that one disease may be
recorded as the primary cause of death but ignores the underlying infection. For example,
a patient‘s record may indicate that they died from pneumonia but ignore the HIV/AIDS
they suffered from which would have made that individual more susceptible to infection
and unable to fight it off. This creates misleading and skewed data as complete statistics
go unrecorded and make it difficult to track the incidence, prevalence, and mortality of
these diseases. Also, health agencies and non-governmental organizations often
specialize or record data separately by individual illnesses. Therefore, it is necessary to
consider the available data cumulatively as the Russian Federation‘s health problems are
a combination of poor healthcare services and malnutrition in addition to infectious
diseases.
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HIV/AIDS
HIV/AIDS is one of the most destructive diseases currently ravaging the Russian
population. At this time, an HIV-positive diagnosis is all but a death sentence as the
average life expectancy between the initial HIV-infection and death is estimated at no
more than twelve years.79 This is largely due to the high cost and low availability of
antiretroviral therapy which today has the ability to substantially extend the life of an
HIV positive patient‘s life and improve their overall quality of life.80 The disease was
initially concentrated in three high-risk groups: commercial sex workers, the prison
population, and intravenous drug users.
A recent [2005] study conducted in Saint Petersburg found 30 percent of injecting
drug users to be HIV-positive. Various other studies have found HIV rates among
commercial sex workers in Saint Petersburg to range between 30 to 60
percent.…The HIV prevalence rate among Russia‘s large inmate population is
reportedly four times higher than in the population at large.81
These three high risk groups form a self-reinforcing cycle as sex workers may also be
intravenous drug users or HIV-positive former prisoners have contact with sex workers
(See Figure 2). However, the disease has started to break out from these three groups,
through homosexual and heterosexual contact, as members of high-risk groups have
contact with individuals outside this cycle who unknowingly become carriers themselves.
Heterosexual transmission of HIV/AIDs in particular has been on the rise. ―In 2005,
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heterosexual transmission accounted for 32 percent of newly registered cases of HIV
infection, up from just 6 percent in 2001.‖82

The Dynamic of how HIV/AIDS is Spread among Russia’s High Risk Groups

Figure 2. Image in Jeffrey Holachek, Russia’s Shrinking Population and the Russian Military’s HIV/AIDS
Problem (Atlantic Council of the United States, September 2006), 5, http://www.acus.org/docs/0609HIV_Russian_Military-Holachek.pdf.

As referenced above, an exact estimate of how many people in Russia are actually
infected with the HIV/AIDS (or other diseases) is impossible to determine and differs
based on which government agency or international organization one chooses to
reference.
In September 2005, Dr. Vadim Pokrovskiy, Chief of Russia‘s Federal AIDS
Center in Moscow and Russia‘s leading expert on HIV/AIDS, testified before the
Russian Duma that a total of 330,500 Russians had been officially registered as
having HIV or AIDS…[but] that the actual number of Russians living with HIV
could be as high as a million people, over half of whom do not know they are
HIV-positive.83
82
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UNAIDS‘s 2009 average estimate of the number of people living with HIV/AIDS is
980,000 within an estimated range of 840,000 to 1,200,000.84 CIA World Factbook also
estimates approximately 980,000 HIV/AIDS cases.85 However, according to some
sources, the actual number of cases may run as high as 1.586 or even two million.87
This statistical outlook grows worse when considering the fact that the majority of
those infected are Russian youth. Eighty percent of the HIV positive population is under
the age of 30,88 and infection is relatively equal between males and females.89 The
majority of newly registered HIV infections are among those 15-29 years of age.90 In
contrast, in the United States and Western Europe, 70 percent of those infected are men
over the age of 30.91 The increased infection rate for Russian women is likely due to the
increase in heterosexual transmission.92 Also, ―[i]n 2005, over 11,000 pregnant women in
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Russia tested positive for HIV‖ meaning that a certain percentage of children born
already carry the fatal disease.93
Therefore, not only are both genders being hit equally by this disease but it is
primarily targeting Russia‘s future generations, even the unborn. The impact on the 15-29
aged cohorts will reduce the number of individuals that will be able to both serve in the
military and fill vacancies in civilian workforce. Competition between the two is also
likely to increase with most young adults preferring the civilian workforce over military
service due to the current poor conditions inside the military. The impact on females is
especially important as it further reduces the number of women who will live to reach the
prime childbearing age group of 20-29, and those that do and are infected with the virus
are likely to pass it on to their children. Therefore, the impact of HIV/AIDs on the
military is that fewer individuals will be able to serve because they are already infected
with the HIV/AIDS virus when they are called up for draft. Also, the disease is currently
reducing the number of women who will live to bear children which means that there will
be fewer few individuals born in the next generation to fill the ranks and meet
conscription quotas.

Tuberculosis
Tuberculosis has become a major problem in Russia and its impact is
compounded by the fact that those infected with TB are often co-infected with
HIV/AIDS. However, attempting to estimate the number of individuals with this coinfection is difficult at best as there is a gap between those that are known to be infected
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with both diseases; know they carry one but not the other; or do not know that they are
infected with either. UNAIDS estimates that, globally, a third of all people living with
HIV are co-infected with TB.94 As of 2009, it is believed that as many as two-thirds of
Russians with AIDS at death were also suffering from TB, up from 50 percent five years
ago.95 In addition, the spread of drug resistant TB and multi-drug resistant TB (MDR-TB)
have started to increase in prevalence which will only make it harder to cure new TB
cases.96 The World Health Organization estimates that as of 2009 there were 190,000
cases of TB in Russia with a low/high estimate between 65 and 320 thousand
respectively.97 Globally, of the 440,000 cases of MDR-TB in 2008, 38,000 were in
Russia which indicates that MDR-TB is gaining a foothold.98 In 2007, a total of 24,000
Russians died from TB.99 In comparison, in the United States, with a population twice the
size of Russia, only 650 died of the infection.100
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Malnutrition and Deficiencies
As surprising it may seem for an industrialized state such as Russia, malnutrition
is a major problem affecting all strata of society that has a significant impact on the
development of the population, particularly its youngest members. One of the most
surprising statistics was provided by the National Institute of Nutrition of the Russian
Academy of Medical Sciences which determined that half of all newborn children were
found to be iodine or calcium deficient.101 According to an article published in the
February 2007 issue of Public Health of the Russian Federation, at the beginning of the
decade starting with 2000:
[A] Vitamin C deficit was found among 60 to 80 percent of the population
regardless of income, a calcium [deficiency] among 40 to 60 percent, iron
deficiency among 20 to 40 percent, folic acid among 70 to 80 percent, a
vitamin B complex deficit among almost 40 percent, and IDD (iodine
deficit deficiency) among almost 70 percent of the population.102
Vitamin deficiencies reduce a body‘s ability to fight off infection103 while a deficiency in
calcium increases bone and skeletal illnesses.104 The rise in iodine deficiency is due to the
fact that iodized salt has not been produced in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet
Union and little has been imported.105 ―In young children, iodine deficiency causes
mental retardation.‖106 While the impact of these deficiencies may not be readily apparent
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or have an immediate impact, over time they have the potential to drastically impact the
overall health of the Russian population and therefore the pool of potential candidates for
military service.

Alcoholism
Alcoholism is a disease of epidemic proportions facing Russian society.
According to the Russian interior minister, Rashid Nurgaliyev, ―[a]lochol consumption is
more than double the critical level set by the World Health Organization.‖107 As many as
20 million Russians are referred to as being alcoholics.108 ―Poisoning by counterfeit
alcohol kills 42,000 Russian every year,‖109 compared to 300 in the United States.110 In
2001, accidental alcohol poisoning equated to a rate of 28.5 per 100,000 of the population
which was 120 times the European average.111 Another ―75,000 die of alcohol-related
diseases….[and] 500,000 die annually from diseases, crimes and accidents due to
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alcohol.‖112 Russia also has one of the highest levels of per capita consumption among
adults, listed at 18 liters of pure alcohol annually.113
Alcohol abuse is also on the rise amongst Russian youth. The average age of
people who begin drinking has decreased from 16 to 13 years.114 ―The total number of
children aged 10-14 who drink alcoholic spirits rose 15.4% in 2008 (10.85 million).‖115
The consequence of these factors is that thousands of Russians are dying every year,
further adding to Russia‘s demographic decline. Working age males are the hardest hit by
the effects of alcohol. ―Conservative estimates attribute 31-43% of deaths among
working-age men to alcohol.‖116 This reduces the number of males who currently can or
will be able to serve in the armed forces and the civilian work force. Meanwhile, those
that suffer from alcoholism fare no better being functionally useless in either the military
or civilian establishments.

Other Health Issues
The health issues listed above provide only a snapshot of the problems facing the
Russian population and by extension their ability to field a large military force. An indepth and exhaustive review of all the health and mortality issues plaguing the Russian
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population is beyond the scope of this product. The purpose here is to focus attention on
the fact the prevalence of communicable, non-communicable diseases, and external
causes of death exist at high rates and often far higher than their European and Western
counterparts; and these rates are steadily increasing in incidence, prevalence, and
mortality. The net effect is that as the population decreases, there will be fewer
individuals – particularly draft-eligible males – that can serve in the armed forces. In
addition, there will be a negative impact on the economy and GDP growth as fewer
Russians live to fill vacancies in the economy, or are healthy and able enough to fill
them.
As indicated by the data, the impact of these illnesses and other issues is
especially hard on Russian males. Sixty percent of Russian males smoke which increases
the chance for cancer and future health complications.117 Meanwhile, the suicide rate
among men is the second highest in the world and three times the rate in the United
States.118 Also, ―external causes of death (murders, accidents, poisoning, traffic accidents,
and the like)…are the second most common cause of death‖ in Russia among the general
population.119 By comparison, worldwide, external causes of death fall between fifth and
ninth on the list.120 The murder rate in Russia is especially high compared to other
developed nations. In 2009, it is believed that there were some 46,200 murders, 2.5 times
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the officially government statistics of 18,200.121 By comparison, there were only 16,000
murders in the United States, a country with twice Russia‘s population and much looser
firearm restrictions.122 It is estimated that as many as ―50 percent of 16-year-old males in
Russia do not survive until age 60; [and] 40 percent of all males die between 16 and 60
years of age.‖123 Drug use is also a growing concern amongst Russians with an estimated
5 million addicts,124 the majority of them in the 18-30 year age range.125 Factor in
Russian males‘ high share of alcoholism and share of traffic fatalities (over 70%),126 and
their equal share of HIV/AIDs and TB infection, and the conclusion that must be reached
is that without strong and immediate change in these trends, Russia is heading for a
demographic catastrophe that it may not be able to recover from.

Demographics is Destiny
Quantifying the impact of all these problems and issues is difficult if not
impossible. Part of the problem stems from the fact that comprehensive studies of all
these issues in conjunction have not been conducted. Domestic Russian government

121

Andy Potts, ―Crime and Punishment in Modern Russia,‖ The Moscow News, January 24, 2011,
http://themoscownews.com/society/20110124/188356204.html.
122

Ibid.

123

Feshbach, Russian Demography, Health and the Military: Current and Future Issues, 6.

124

Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, ―Russia Blames NATO for Heroin Surge from Afghanistan,‖ BBC News,
February 27, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8540726.stm.
125

Illicit Drug Trends in the Russian Federation (Regional Office for Russia and Belarus: United Nations,
Office on Drugs and Crime, April 2008), 10, http://www.unodc.org/documents/regional/centralasia/Illicit%20Drug%20Trends%20Report_Russia.pdf.
126

―Violence and Injury Prevention and Disability (VIP),‖ World Health Organization, 2007,
http://www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/road_safety_status/country_profiles/russian_federation.pdf
.

55

agencies, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations tend to focus
their missions and data collection efforts on singular issues such as alcoholism,
HIV/AIDS, or female reproduction. Therefore, professional analysis of how all these
social problems fit in together, how they interact, and what their cumulative impact on
the Russian population will be is difficult – if not impossible – to determine. This is
compounded by the fact that there is extensive crossover between all these issues. An
intravenous drug user suffering from malnutrition and infected with the HIV/AIDS virus
is one such example of an individual that falls into three distinct categories. Or the death
of an AIDS patient that is co-infected with the tuberculosis may only be recorded as a TB
death and ignore the underlying infection which would have weakened their immune
systems substantially. In addition, the magnitude of these problems is only now starting
to emerge and catch the attention of institutions and researchers, so any research may still
be in the early stages with no conclusions.
How exactly all these numerous social and health problems will impact the future
of the Russian population is unknown. However, based on the current statistical data and
the current lack of government intervention the future looks bleak. The Russian state
faces a demographic abyss that if goes uncorrected will spell disaster for the Russian
population. The effects of these problems are already starting to be felt and are likely to
increase in prominence as they mature and metastasize. The impact on Russia‘s military
will be profound as the pool of eligible candidates for military service grows smaller with
each passing year because of fewer male births, more male deaths, and a shortage of
healthy able bodies.
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Once again, nuclear weapons must fill this ever increasing gap in Russia‘s
national security. As the number of individuals that can serve in the military becomes
increasingly finite, it will be impossible for the Russian government to maintain a
million-man army. If the Russian leadership reduces the size of its military forces to
accommodate this reality, it will still leave them feeling vulnerable and unable to meet all
of their military commitments and national security needs, especially considering their
current threat perception. Therefore, nuclear weapons provide the ideal solution through
which to overcome their manpower issues yet still provide an assurance of security and
military success. Unless the demographic and social trends within Russian society are
reversed, Russia‘s leaders will have no option but to increase their reliance on nuclear
weapons to fill the void left by their conventional military forces.
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CHAPTER SIX: RUSSIA’S MILITARY CAPABILITIES
Conventional Capability
Russia possesses substantial conventional military forces. In terms of raw figures,
the conventional military of the Russian Federation represents a formidable force that
would make any adversary think twice about becoming involved against it militarily. The
Russian Federation has almost a million individuals in uniform at any one time and tens
of thousands of pieces of military equipment at its disposal, everything from tanks,
armored personnel carriers, to jet fighters, to cruisers and destroyers. However, closer
examination of the equipment available and the status of current soldiers belie the raw
numbers.
First, most of the equipment fielded by ground, air, and sea forces was produced
by the Soviet Union or is based on Cold War design. The production and distribution of
new equipment that represents an improvement over the previous generation and that is
appropriate for the changes in military conflict in the 21st century is slow. Maintenance
and upgrades of current equipment are unevenly spread across the military and most
often consist of the utmost minimum to ensure they continue to function and extend the
service life of equipment as long as possible.
Second, the Russian Government has demonstrated that it does not believe that its
own military industry currently has the ability to produce the weapons that Russian
conventional forces will require in the future. This has been highlighted most recently by
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a number of foreign weapons purchases including the French built Mistral-Class
amphibious assault ship, and the decision to purchase Israeli produced unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs).127 Russia is also in talks to purchase 500 light armored vehicles from
French military manufacturer Panhard.128 The contract could be worth as much as $260
million and would provide ―3.1 ton armored vehicles…on a 4x4 wheel platform‖ for
Russia‘s Federal Security Service border guards.129 On February 9, 2011, the Russian
Defense Ministry signed a deal with private defense company Rheinmetall to build a
combat training center for the Russia military.130
The defense arm of the [Rheinmetall] is…Europe‘s top supplier of defense
technology and security equipment for ground forces. It specializes in armor,
gunnery, propellants and munitions manufacturing but has a fairly broad defense
portfolio comprising training and simulation solutions as well as command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, target acquisition and
reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) — all of which are of particular interest for
Moscow.131
The facility would provide training for brigade-size units and would provide modeling
and simulated tactical combat situations.132 On March 5, 2011, it was also reported that
the Ministry of Defense would be purchasing light armored vehicles for motor infantry
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units from Rheinmetall Chempro.133 Finally, Russia may acquire as many as 3,000 Italian
Iveco M65E vehicles, light multirole combat vehicles for the Russian army.134
In total, Russia is expected to purchase as much as $12 billion in arms from
European and Israeli companies over the next five years, much of it from Europe‘s
premier defense contractors.135 Together, these and other actions show that the Russian
military industrial complex is currently unable to produce weapons of the necessary type,
quality, and sophistication and that the only alternative it to turn to foreign purchases to
meet Russian military requirements. The benefit of foreign purchases is that it saves the
RF massive amounts of money in research and development, construction, and allows for
an increase in capability much faster than if it decided to achieve it on its own. The
downside is that it diverts money away from state defense industries that could use the
funds to develop the domestic capability and know-how on their own. Also, the Russians
realize that such weapons purchases will only allow them catch-up so far and that they
will never be able to purchase top-of-the-line weapons from abroad.136 Therefore, foreign
purchases will not allow for an equalization of military capabilities.
Third, examination of the political debate surrounding military reform and
modernization reveals that there is no clear consensus on what to do, how to do it, and
what the effectiveness of previous reforms has been. Talk of military reform has been
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ongoing since the collapse of the Soviet Union; however, the particular direction that it
should go in has been unclear. Under former Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev (19972001), a heavy emphasis was placed on the modernization and improvement of the
Strategic Missile Forces (SMF). This was partially because Sergeyev was formerly the
commander of the SMF; because it was believed that the nuclear forces would be the best
way to protect the RF at a time that the Russian conventional forces were weakened;137
and because it
was justified by an irrefutable argument that the available limited funds could buy
a reasonable modernization of the nuclear triad – but would disappear without a
trace if channeled toward the unreformable ground forces.138
This policy of favoring the SMF was finally overturned by President Putin in 2001 and
resulted in the removal of Sergeyev and his replacement with Sergei Ivanov.139
Since then, there have been several different plans for modernization,
rearmament, and reform. The most significant proposals were to phase out conscription in
favor of a professional all-volunteer military, however, to-date this has resulted in limited
success and conscription is expected to continue for the time being. In fact, the only
substantial change has been to decrease the number of circumstances under which a
conscription deferment can be obtained and to make non-military civil service more
unappealing. The goal of these two actions was to increase the number of males available
for conscription and make it the more preferred choice of mandatory public service. The
fact remains that Russian conventional forces continue to suffer from serious personnel
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and equipment problems which undermine their ability to perform their duties and
discharge their responsibilities.
Unlike in the United States and other Western nations, the military budget of the
Russian Federation is not openly discussed in parliament or available for public
scrutiny.140 This lack of transparency makes it difficult to know exactly how much money
is devoted to defense overall, how much is allocated for each branch, or how the Ministry
of Defense chooses to spend its funds.141 Therefore, it is difficult to ascertain how much
money is actually devoted to modernization and reform and whether or not it is spent
appropriately. Public statements by Ministry of Defense officials are constantly subject to
change and sometimes contradict themselves making them questionable sources of
information.
Due to these issues, ascertaining the abilities and overall effectiveness of Russia‘s
conventional forces must be based more on observations rather than official reports or
statement. Therefore, the recent Russo-Georgian conflict in August of 2008 provided
outside observers with an excellent opportunity to see Russian air, ground, and sea forces
engaged in action. This conflict provides a microcosm for what could be expected from
Russian forces in the event of any of the potential conflicts outlined in the Russian
Military Doctrine. Post-war analysis of Russian performance is strikingly in contrast with
Russian assertions of military prowess. Throughout the following analysis of Russia‘s
conventional forces, comparisons of each branches‘ performance during the Georgian
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conflict will be highlighted to emphasize the current capabilities within the Russian
military.

Ground Forces
Russia‘s ground forces comprise the largest branch of Russia‘s conventional
forces. Russia has always been a land power out of geographic necessity. The ground
forces are the most important because most of the external threats that the RF faces,
perceives to be facing, or is likely to face in the future emanate primarily along Russia‘s
periphery. Therefore, ground forces are the most logical force with which to meet those
threats. Naval and air force assets are mostly limited to supporting and complimentary
roles in conventional conflicts. Despite the importance of ground forces to Russia‘s
national security, they appear to be the weakest branch of all three.

Personnel
Russia‘s ground forces today suffer from a multitude of problems that more often
than not go unaddressed. The first major problem is personnel. ―In line with the ongoing
military reform, the Russian Armed Forces will be downsized to 1 million personnel by
2016, enlisting 150,000 officers and about 745,000 soldiers‖ the majority of whom will
be conscripts.142 Yet, there are currently consistent manpower shortages at every level. In
November 2008, during the immediate post-war analysis between Russia and Georgia,
Army-General Nikolay Makarov, Chief of the General Staff stated that ―[e]ighty-three
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percent of Army units were numerically incomplete, and only 17 percent were combat
ready.‖143
On January 1, 2008 conscription service was reduced from 2 years to 1 year.144
This does not allow for enough time to appropriately train conscripts in their
specialization nor allow for enough time to create proper unit cohesion. The declining
demographics situation in the RF is already making it increasingly difficult to find
eligible candidates for military service. Also, convincing Russian youths that military
service is a promising career is challenging as reports of abuse and hazing, squalid living
conditions, exploitation of ―conscripts and contract soldier by commanding officer for
personal financial gain…[and the]…accident prone nature of the service‖ permeates the
draft eligible cohort.145
Meanwhile, there are more attractive and luring opportunities in the private sector
that offer a better life and higher salary than could be achieved through military
service.146 After multiple pay raises even as recently as 2006,
platoon or company commanders – ranking from senior lieutenant to captain – are
still paid less than escalator attendants in Moscow (8,000 rubles [around $285]).
The monthly wage of a Moscow streetcar driver (18,000 rubles) is said to be
beyond their dreams.147
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As early as 1996, ―high school students rated ―army officer‖ as the least prestigious on a
long list of occupations.‖148 The result is that the quality of many conscripts recruited
every year, in terms of health and education, is decreasing as those who can, do anything
possible to avoid service, leaving the military to recruit the least desirable candidates.
Data collected on the spring 2005 conscription cycle showed that…45 percent had
never held a job or studies at the postsecondary level, 5 percent had criminal
records, 25 percent had not finished high school, nearly one-ninth were alcoholics
and/or regular drugs users, and some were illiterate.149
The Russian Government has decided to attack the problem of finding conscripts
not by improving conditions and clamping down on abuses, but by making it harder for
Russian males to avoid service. Russian police in major cities are now used to help
round-up conscripts.150 Raids have been performed on college dormitories to find
students that have been draft dodging.151 The number of eligible deferments and waivers
has been reduced from 25 to 16.152
Particular attention has been focused on the higher education system, so that
fewer colleges would have military departments and more graduates would be
eligible for draft.153
Civilian service, which has long been a popular alternative to military service, has
been drastically altered to make it increasingly unappealing. Civilian service allows draftage young men the option of opting out of conventional military service and choosing
148

Ibid., 63.

149

Ibid., 64.

150

Alexander Golts, ―The Collapse of the Russian Army from Within.‖

151

Ibid.

152

Zoltan Barany, Democratic Breakdown and the Decline of the Russian Military, 64.

153

Pavel Baev, ―Neither Reform Nor Modernisation: The Armed Forces Under and After Putin‘s
Command,‖ in The Politics of Security in Modern Russia, ed. Mark Galeotti (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), 78.

65

civilian service instead.154 However, in July of 2002, then-President Putin signed
legislation into law that obligated anyone choosing civilian service to serve for three-anda-half years, three times longer than the current conventional military conscripts.155
―Furthermore, the law – which came into force in January 2004 – says that alternative
service must be performed away from the individual‘s normal residence.‖156 Meanwhile,
military conscripts are allowed to serve near their home. Therefore, choosing civilian
service would place an individual far from home, increasing the economic burden on
anyone who desires to pursue this alternative. The result has been unsurprising with only
―186 out of about 155,000 draftees in the spring 2005 conscription cycle‖ selecting
civilian service, and even then ―military commissioners often demand bribes (up to $800)
even to accept application for alternative service.‖157 The Russian Government‘s solution
to finding people to meet its military quotas is to invest more in forcing Russian males to
serve as opposed to make military service more appealing and desirable.
However, even if the Russian military could meets its yearly conscription quotas
without difficulty and increase the amount of service required of new conscripts, this
would do little to substantially improve unit cohesion or ground forces capability so long
as the destructive practice of ―dedovshchina‖ exists and permeates the enlisted ranks.
Dedovshchina is a system of ―institutionalized bullying by older conscripts‖ upon new
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and lower levels of enlisted personnel.158 This abuse is believed to be responsible for
numerous mutinies, suicides, and potentially thousands of avoidable deaths each year. In
2005 alone, ―hazing was the direct cause of six thousand injuries requiring
hospitalization.‖159
According to official figures, there are about a thousand non-combat deaths each
year in the Russian armed forces but the well-informed Soldiers‘ Mothers
Committees claim the true figure is closer to 3,000 deaths a year.160
Most of these deaths are a result of bullying and suicides of soldiers who can no longer
face the abuse.161 What is worse is that this kind of abuse is not limited to the enlisted
personnel. There are numerous accounts of officers abusing other officers or enlisted
personnel which often result in serious injury and death.162 These kinds of abuses have
created conditions of low morale amongst Russian soldiers and heavily contribute to
Russian society‘s negative attitude toward the military and military service.
The problems with the officer corps are not limited to physical abuse. Corruption
and embezzlement have become systemic as military officials find ways to line their
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pockets at every opportunity.163 Accounts are falsified by commanders who collect
salaries for soldiers who do not exist. Soldiers are hired out as slave labor by their
commanders for cash or favors such as performing harvests or building dachas.164 In
2005,
theft alone amounted to $60 million…[and]…about 16,000 military personnel
were charged with a variety of crimes, including 100 senior commanders and
eight generals or admirals.165
In 2008, of the over 20,000 recorded crimes involving the Armed Forces and other
security departments by military prosecutors, one in four was committed by an officer,
causing over 2 billion rubles ($56 million) in damages.166 Bribes to the correct
individuals and of appropriate size can help someone avoid military service, get them a
plum position, or a preferred stationing.167 Money allocated for salaries, barracks
improvements, and even food is often siphoned off into personal pockets while soldiers
live in squalor and go hungry.168 This sometimes leaves soldier with no choice other than
to forage or beg for food. ―There are also disturbing reports of commanders…forcing
[soldiers] into prostitution.‖169 Meanwhile,
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[a]rms and ammunition disappear, perhaps to hunters, or gangsters or terrorist, but
no-one knows. Fuel, spare parts and vehicles can be bought.…Vital parts of
weapons are sold for the precious metals they contain.‖170
What is worse is that the Ministry of Defense and senior officials know that these abuses
take place and do little if anything to punish the perpetrators or stop it from continuing.
In April 2002, the Minister of Defense, visiting 20 Guards Army in the Moscow
Military District, described the volume of theft there as ‗simply impermissible‘,
which raises the intriguing possibility that the ministry recognizes an acceptable
level of theft.171
Another alterative the Russian leadership has undertaken to help fill the ranks is
to ease the restrictions regarding the recruitment of foreign citizen. ―According to the
amended law, a citizen of any foreign country, aged 18-30, can now sign an initial 5-year
contract to join the army.‖172 However, there are no plans at this time to fill the officer
ranks with foreign nationals.173 As an incentive, recruits are offered Russian citizenship
after three years of service.174 However, this policy is not expected to make a substantial
difference in the Russian recruitment shortfall.
The recruitment situation in Russian is only going to get worse as time goes by
unless substantial improvements and reforms take place. According to Colonel Alexei
Knyazev, the officer in charge of the army draft, as many as 133,000 young men are
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evading the draft as of September 2010.175 Meanwhile, as many as 25-30 percent of
conscripts were considered unfit for military service in 2007.176 In 2009, President
Dimitri Medvedev announced that this number had increased to 40 percent.177 Igor
Bykov, head of the defense ministry‘s medical department, reported that ―mental,
musculoskeletal and drug-related illnesses, as well as TB and AIDS, topped the list of
diseases that make young men unfit for military service.‖178
The result is that ground forces personnel have low morale, are undernourished,
are forced to endure humiliation and abuse by their fellow enlisted comrades and officers,
and are poorly equipped and trained. This creates ground forces that are unprepared to
engage an adversary in almost any conflict without major preparation ahead of time. The
exploitation of soldiers by their officers
indicates that the average Russian officer does not see his soldiers as fellow
servicemen or even as fellow human beings. There is no mutual respect between
leaders and led, and it is difficult to see how a professional army can be created
without one.179
As a result, the ―Russian armed forces are rapidly losing the esprit de corps or military
ethos which makes a military organization an effective fighting force (and politically
reliable).‖180 If concrete action is not taken to alleviate these problems in the ranks, then
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Russia‘s ground forces will be nothing more than mobs with guns leaving the Russian
Federation vulnerable to outside attack.

Equipment

Equipment is also a major problem that plagues ground forces. Most of the
equipment currently available was inherited from the Soviet Union or is based on Soviet
design. Funding for even minimum maintenance of current weapons inventories is often
lagging, resulting in tanks, vehicles, communications equipment, and a multitude of other
items that simply do not work or easily break down.181 As mentioned, corrupt officials
are not above selling spare parts and parts made with precious metals for a quick profit.
Modern replacements are slow to arrive, assuming any are even planned. ―According to
some reports [as of 2007], only about 10 to 20 percent of all weapons in the inventories
[of the Russian armed forces, not just ground forces] are modern.‖182 Army-General
Makarov stated that, ―Russia plans to modernize 30 percent of its weapon systems by
2012, and 70 percent by 2020,‖ but the likelihood of achieving this goal is questionable.
Funding for upgrading existing equipment and producing new weapons are in short
supply.183 ―For example, between 2000 and 2004 the Russian army added only 15 new
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tanks to its inventory of about 23,000.‖184 While the delivery of new equipment has
improved since 2006, there is still little to show for it.185
In 2008, 50 new T-90 tanks were delivered to two battalions.186 The T-90, the
most modern tank in the RF‘s arsenal, has been in production since 1995 yet still only
constitutes 1.5 percent of the total tank fleet.187 However, in reality the T-90 is nothing
more than a modification of the Soviet T-72 tank which entered production in 1971 but
costs 118 million rubles or $4 million per unit.188 Even the achievement of deploying new
equipment, if only in limited numbers, is often tainted as well. During a session of the
Defense and Security Committee of the upper house of the Russian parliament, Ground
Forces Chief Colonel-General (three stars) Alexander Postnikov stated,
The weapon models that are manufactured by our industry, including armor,
artillery and small arms and light weapons, fail to meet the standards that exist in
NATO and even China.189
Specifically, he said that it would be easier to purchase three Leopards, Germany‘s main
battle tank, for the cost a single T-90.190 The inability of the RF to provide its soldiers
with the necessary equipment to allow them to perform their duties, or the funding
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needed to maintain their current equipment does not instill confidence, or loyalty for that
matter, in the average soldier‘s mind.

Communications
Communications was one issue that seriously impaired ground forces‘ ability to
perform their duties during the Georgian conflict.
Communication systems and electronic warfare assets employed by commanders
and frontline forces were obsolete.…The 58th Army commander, LieutenantGeneral Anatoliy Khrulev, was reported to have communicated with his forces in
the midst of combat via a satellite phone borrowed from a journalist, since
communication between units was unavailable.191
The difficulty in communications prevented space-based and electronic intelligence from
being passed on to leaders about the buildup of Georgian troops prior to the conflict.192
Meanwhile,
maritime and topographic maps provided conflicting data…[and]…[s]atellitetargeting support to artillery was woefully absent, thereby prevented the use of
precision-guided munitions and the accurate adjustment of artillery fire.
The result was that ground troops were forced to use 1960s optical equipment to target
conventional weapons systems.193 At the time of the conflict, the Russian Federation‘s
independent global positioning system, GLONASS, was not yet operation due to a
―subcritical number of satellites in orbit and the ground units lacked receivers‖194 which

191

Roger N. McDermott, ―Russia‘s Conventional Armed Forces and the Georgian War,‖ 70.

192

Ibid.

193

Ibid.

194

Carolina Vendil Pallin and Fredrik Westerlund, ―Russia‘s War in Georgia: Lessons and Consequences,‖
411.

73

forced the Russian Army to go into combat using World War II era compasses and maps
for guidance.195
Finally, it is also believed that the lack of inter-unit communications is what
contributed to the high number of ―friendly-fire‖ incidents. Currently there is no
interoperable communications system, unlike in most advanced militaries, which allows
for integrated communications between ―tank, motorized-rifle, helicopter, attack-plane,
and tactical-bombers units.‖196 This was a lesson learned by the United States during the
invasion of Grenada in 1983 when marines on the island could not communicate with
ships off the coast to call in air support. Yet there are still no plans to resolve this
problem within the Russian military. Lack of even basic interoperable communications
speaks poorly of the abilities of the Russian military. If the Georgian conflict had lasted
longer than five days, casualties simply due to a lack of communication could have been
substantially higher.

Ground Forces‘ Performance in Georgia
There were several other miscellaneous mistakes and failures as the Russian
Army went into combat against Georgia in August of 2008, several of which will be
explored below. First, the tanks and vehicles with which the Russian Army went into
combat were in some cases useless. Russian soldier preferred to ride on their armored
personnel carriers and tanks rather than in them because they ―could not resist anti-tank
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rockets or mines or small caliber armour piercing ammunition.‖197 Also, the reactive
armor canisters of 58th Army‘s T-72 tanks, those meant to ―deflect high-explosive antitanks (HEAT) weapons‖ were empty.198 This rendered the reactive armor useless and
anyone caught inside the tanks, should they be struck, dead.199 The 58th Army left
numerous vehicles by the roadside on its drive into Georgia because many of them
simply broke down.200 These breakdowns caused traffic jams that would have made easy
targets had the Georgia Air Force been able to strafe them.201 Most of the 58th Army‘s
tanks, ―60 to 75 percent…deployed to the theater of operation were older T-62 and T72Ms,‖202 tanks designed and built in the 1960s and 1970s. Even the modern T-72BM,
introduced in 2006, ―could not withstand Georgian antitank warheads.‖203 In addition,
[o]lder tanks not only lacked GPS but also thermal imagers and IFF systems.
Moreover, the armored columns included BMP-1 and BMD-1 (infantry personnel
carrier) with ―primitive‖ sights and vision equipment.204
Friendly fire incidents were not only due to communications equipment failure,
but also due to the unprofessional nature of Russian troops, which were often not
―equipped according to official regulations.‖205 Russian soldiers tend to choose
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personal equipment themselves, with the result that Russian troops in Georgia
looked more like partisans, which also accounted for why they were reduced to
using armlets to identify themselves, and that it was possible to distinguish
commanding officers at a far distance.206
The lack of IFF systems in Russian vehicle and tanks increased the probability of
friendly-fire incidents because their Georgian adversary was fielding Soviet-era vehicles
similar or identical to what the Russians had deployed.207 Meanwhile, the absence of
more advanced imaging equipment, such as thermal- and night-vision equipment
amongst Russian troops allowed for Georgian forces to regain ground at night lost during
the day which may have also prolonged the conflict and increased Russian casualties.208
Based on the information above, one overarching conclusion can be reached about
the status of the Russian ground forces: they are seriously unprepared. The Russian
military is still organized and prepared to fight mass warfare as it did against Nazi
Germany. Military forces today must be smaller, faster, and more sophisticated than in
the past, yet the Russian ground forces continue to remain a pre-computer age fighting
force ready to lead a mass charge.209 The pervasive culture of abuse and corruption, lack
of accountability, appropriate funding and oversight, low morale, and Russian youths‘
desire to avoid service at all costs has created a largely inefficient ground force that will
not be able to engage effectively in future conflicts. Russia‘s ―victory‖ against Georgia
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had more to do with the relative size of the clashing militaries and Georgian military
mistakes, than the superior ability of Russian conventional forces. Unless drastic and
forceful military modernization and reform takes places, Russia‘s ground forces will fail
in their responsibility to defend the Russian Federation.

Air Force
The Russian Air Force (VVS) is not immune to the personnel and equipment
problems faced by the ground forces. Just as with the ground forces equipment, the air
force inventory is aging as replacements and appropriate funding for maintenance,
repairs, and upgrades are few and far between. Most of the fighters and technology was
also developed by the Soviet Union or is based on Soviet design. Lack of adequate
preventative maintenance and training has led to increases in accidents and crashes as the
VVS tries to fly aircraft beyond their service expiration dates.
The last few years have seen a string of accidents that only emphasizes the
deficiencies within the VVS. In March 2007 two MiG-29s collided which led to the
replacement of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force;…in January 2008 a trainer aircraft, an
L-39, was lost as well; in March of the same year an Su-25 exploded and a Su-27 crash
landed; in October a MiG-29 broke down in mid-air; and finally in December another
MiG-29 disintegrated.210 After that final MiG-29 crash, the entire MiG-29 fighter fleet
was grounded.211
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Following a Mig-29 crash in East Siberia last December, the Defense Ministry
admitted for the first time that Russia‘s Mig-29 fleet was mostly outdated and not
capable of performing combat duties.212
As many as 70 percent of the MiG-29s in service are too old to take to the skies and only
―30% of the Mig-29s were allowed to resume flights after a month-long suspension.‖213
A possible cause of the crash was corrosion on the tail unit which was discovered after an
inspection of all aircraft of this type was performed.214
Meanwhile, the low number of training hours logged by pilots is becoming a
major problem. As of 2007, the ―number of flight hours [was] far below standard levels:
it ranges from 20 to 25 hours annually for fighter aviation to 60 hours annually for
transport aviation.‖215 Also, better qualified pilots are given priority in flying time,
leaving second- and third-class pilots barely able to maintain their qualifications, let
alone advance to the next level. This is a disturbing trend in pilot training especially since
―first-class pilots today represent 40 per cent of the total number of pilots in air
regiments, and on average they are only a few years away from the retirement age for
pilots of 45.‖216 During the Georgian conflict, five Russian aircraft were shot down
during the first day: three Su-25 tactical bombers, one Su-24MR reconnaissance aircraft,
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and one Tu-22M3 long-range bomber217 ―proving that pilots could not perform even
simple combat mission efficiently.‖218 Ironically, the pilots that
took part in the air assault were most likely some of the most experienced Russian
pilots, belonging to ground attack regiments with extensive experience from air
operations in Chechnya.…The losses indicate that even within these units there
are deficiencies in pilot training and the technical level of the aircraft.219
Total Russian losses during the war may have exceeded 10 aircraft with at least another
two attributed to Georgian units, one friendly-fire incident, and one aircraft damaged
beyond repair.220
The most glaring failure of the Russian Air Force during the Georgian conflict
was its inability to establish air superiority throughout the entire conflict. The Georgian
Air Force consisted of only a dozen Su-25 attack aircraft, yet was able to execute attack
missions on Russian units until the last day of the conflict.221 The VVS also conducted
―no suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) operations‖ which may have been a
reflection of the fact that, just as with ground forces, the VVS lacks night-fighting
capabilities.222
On the eve of the [Georgian] campaign the VVS had no around-the-clock SEAD
capabilities, which meant Russia did not possess the option of mounting an air
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campaign such as those executed by the United States in the 1991 Gulf War,
Afghanistan in 2001, or Iraq in 2003.223
Therefore, the VVS was unable to do in 2008 what was effectively demonstrated by the
United States almost twenty years ago.
The combat capabilities of helicopter units fared no better than that of fighter
units during the Georgian conflict. This was demonstrated by the fact that ground units
received little to no close air support during the conflict leaving them vulnerable to
ambush.224 One possible reason for this was due to the shortage of forward air controllers
in South Ossetia that would have been able to direct attack aircraft and helicopters and
the fact that ground units were unable to communicate with air elements due to
incompatible radio systems.225
The VVS also chose, for whatever reason, to employ its precision-guided
weapons sparingly. ―The Russian air force appears to…[lack] the training and weapon
systems needed for high precision strikes in situations of low visibility.‖226 The current
arsenal of the VVS precision-guided weapons have a range of 12 kilometers and required
that pilots fly on a straight course before and after launch, exposing the aircraft to enemy
air defense.227 Georgian meteorological conditions during the war consisted of
recurrent cloudiness and a low cloud base, [which] restricted the use of laser and
TV guided weapons, which make up the bulk of the guided weapons in the
Russian arsenal.228
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Therefore, the VVS depended more on unguided bombs and air-to-surface rockets
which lowered the accuracy of strikes and exposed fighter aircraft to increased risk as
unguided weapons require shorter launch distances and therefore greater exposure to
enemy air defense.229 This required more sorties to destroy a single target which also
increased exposure to enemy fire.230 For this reason, it made sense for the VVS to employ
strategic long-range bombers because they could drop unguided munitions from altitudes
beyond what many air defense systems can reach.231 These vulnerabilities of the VVS
underscored the fact that the Russian air force obviously lacked suitable standoff
weapons. Cruise missiles with a conventional warhead have been part of the
Russian air force inventory for some years, albeit in small numbers, and the Tu22M3 bombers can carry such weapons. However, there are no indications of airlaunched cruise missiles having been used in the Five-Day War, which puts the
air force capability to precision strikes over longer distances into question.51 It also
implies that Russia cannot conduct air strikes from a safe distance even in a local
war close to its own borders; Russian pilots have to enter enemy air space when
carrying out air raids and this exposes them to enemy fire. Moreover, the Russian
air units were forced to carry out missions mainly in daylight, since many aircraft
lacked night-vision equipment. This was not the case with the modernized
Georgian Su-25 aircrafts, which were able to operate at night.52 Also, the Russian
air force almost completely lacked the ability to wage electronic warfare, which
could have contributed to suppressing the Georgian air defence.232
Finally, the Russian bomber fleet, Tu-95 ―Bear‖ and Tu-160 ―Blackjack,‖ while
primarily designed as strategic bomber vehicles, are also able to carry conventional
munitions. Emphasis on these aircraft has increased as the Russian Federation has
resumed long-range patrols under Vladimir Putin; however, they are also suffering from
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limited maintenance and there are currently no new replacement aircraft in production
and the newest plan for a new strategic bomber has been put off. The Tu-95 in particular
is a turboprop bomber based on 1950s technology. While the technology in both bombers
has proven itself to be relatively reliable, these aircraft can only be flown so far past their
service lifetimes.
The Bears and Blackjacks also suffer from several unique characteristics that will
only decrease their future reliability. First, the engines for both bombers are no longer in
production and require extensive maintenance to ensure their continued function.233
The service life of the Kuznetsov NK-32 turbofan engines (Tu-160) has now been
extended to 21 years, and of the Kuznetsov NK-12MP turboprop engines (Tu95MS) to 24 years. Analysis of the repair contracts announced by the MoD
[Ministry of Defense] suggests that the engines are a much bigger headache than
the rest of the planes.234
Second, the integral tanks of both bombers (the internal tank that carries the bomber‘s
fuel) have developed cracks that must either be repaired or replaced, and the corrosion or
structural damage of the wings on the bombers have also become issues of concern.235
Maintenance, repairs, and reinforcements will help to keep these aircraft in the air, but
each additional service extension places their aircrews at increased risk. There have
already been two major accidents, one in ―2002 [when] one of the engines of a Tu-95MS
bomber belonging to the 184th TBAP [caught] fire in mid-flight, but the crew managed to
land the plane at its home airfield.‖236 Another accident in 2003 involving a Tu-160 made
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in 1992 which crashed and killed its entire crew when the main integral tank
disintegrated.237 The loss of even a single Tu-160 places an increased strain on this
bomber fleet as there are only sixteen remaining in the Russian inventory. Meanwhile,
there is more flexibility with the Tu-95s, of which there are approximately 60.
Finally, the aircrews of long-range bombers are at particular risk due to the nature
of their mission. Their long-range flights often take them far from Russian territory and
eliminate any hope of successful search-and-rescue operation should an accident occur
abroad. The loss of these aircraft and their crews will decrease Russian bomber
capability. Aircrews of these bombers already complain about the lack of enough rescue
suits available on each bomber.238 Even with enough rescue equipment on board,
aircrews know that their chance of survival is almost zero.
When Soviet planes (including Tu-95 and An-22 [strategic airlifter] aircraft) went
down somewhere far out in the ocean, their crews were always lost. The latest
incident involved a Tu-142MZ long-range anti-submarine aircraft of the Pacific
Fleet Aviation, which was lost in the Tatar Strait in November 2009, only 20km
away from the shore. None of its 11 crew members survived. The Tu-142MZ
model has the same airframe and engines as the Tu-95MS bomber. Even if the
crew (four people for Tu-160 and seven for Tu-95MS) survive the actual crash
somewhere far in the Arctic, Atlantic or Pacific Oceans, they cannot expect swift
rescue by the Russian Air Force or Navy. These services have never had the
technical means or the overall capability to pull off such a rescue.239
While there is no indication of overt dissent or demand for change in conditions among
bomber aircrews, this is definitely a factor that the Russian leadership will have to take
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into account if they wish to continue flying the strategic bomber fleet with such
frequency far from the Russian mainland.
All these facts call attention to the precarious status that the Russian Air Force
finds itself in. The Georgian conflict in particular drew attention to the VVS‘s inability to
suppress or destroy Georgian air defenses;240 defeat the Georgian Air Force; or
effectively defend their aircraft from attack. In addition, the VVS did not possess the
ability to provide close combat support or communicate with its ground troops. Finally,
the arsenal of the VVS prevented its pilots from effectively targeting enemy positions due
to the vulnerability of employing guided munitions and the inefficiency of employing
unguided munitions. The United Sates has demonstrated the superiority of air power on
numerous occasions since 1991. Air power is often the key to victory in major conflicts
and during the Georgian War the Russian military demonstrated that its air force
possesses many weaknesses. The atrophy it suffered during the 1990s in terms of
equipment degradation, pilot training, and development and deployment of new vehicles
has severely limited the capability of this military branch. Without a major investment in
procurement for aircraft, armaments, and training the VVS will continue to remain unable
to fulfill its functions properly.

Navy
The Russian Federation continues to maintain a naval presence even in the face of
severe underfunding. In comparison to the ground forces and air force, the loss of funding
240
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during the 1990s hurt the Russian Navy (VMF) the hardest due to the complex nature of
the equipment, its sensitivity to degradation, and the longer time necessary to rehabilitate
it.241 The neglect and disrepair of the 1990s allowed ―ships to rust and technical expertise,
institutional knowledge and naval traditions to erode.‖242 Weak Russian shipbuilding
capacity and delays in ship construction and funding have resulted in an increasingly
aging Russian fleet in all classes and will make it time consuming to increase the VMF‘s
numbers.243 The same as with air and ground forces, most of the equipment in the VMF‘s
inventory was either built by the Soviet Union or is based on its design. It was only in
2007 with the Steregushchiy-class corvette, that the very first Russian ship was
commissioned that was designed and built from the ground up since the collapse of the
Soviet Union.244 Even so, the quality of new warships is in question due to the fact that
―Russia‘s shipyards were not just quiet for a decade — they spiraled into decay.‖245
The nature of Russian Navy‘s geographic areas of responsibility only makes it
harder to fulfill its mission. Russia‘s naval forces are posted in five major regions: the
Barents, the Baltic, the Black, and the Caspian Seas, and the Pacific Ocean. Furthermore,
with global warming, increased economic opportunities for resource exploitation, and
corresponding competition in the Arctic, the Northern Fleet in the Barents may need to be
241

Pavel Baev, ―Neither Reform Nor Modernisation: The Armed Forces Under and After Putin‘s
Command,‖ 82.
242

―Russia: Trials of the Russian Fleet,‖ Stratfor: Global Intelligence, January 7, 2009,
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090106_russia_gradual_revival_russian_fleet.
243

Pavel Baev, ―Neither Reform Nor Modernisation: The Armed Forces Under and After Putin‘s
Command,‖ 84.
244

―Russia: Future Naval Prospects,‖ Stratfor: Global Intelligence, December 7, 2007,
http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russia_future_naval_prospects.
245

Ibid.

85

expanded or a separate Arctic force may be under consideration. Each of these areas is
important in its own way and geographically isolated from one another.246 Reinforcing
one fleet with assets from another is extremely time consuming or impossible as in the
case of the Caspian flotilla. The Black and Baltic Sea Fleets are boxed in as well since
any ship would have to pass narrow choke points to reach their destinations. The Baltic
Fleet would have to navigate around the islands of Denmark to access the Atlantic.
Meanwhile, any ship in the Black Sea Fleet seeking to reach the Atlantic would have to
navigate the Bosphorus Straits and the Dardanelles, and later on the Straits of Gibraltar to
exit the Mediterranean. All four of these pose navigational choke points limiting the
movement of vessels in and out of these two seas that, in the event of a conflict, could be
closed to Russian naval vessels.
While the Russian Navy has undertaken some limited operations, it is difficult to
gauge the effectiveness of Russian warships, submarines, and sailors. Participation in the
UN sanctioned Somali anti-piracy operation247 and the Georgian conflict demonstrate that
the Russian Navy is not totally crippled, however these naval operations tend to be the
exception rather than the rule. In January of 2009, only five warships out of the entire
Russian Fleet (not including auxiliaries) were deployed abroad.248 During the Georgian
conflict, the VMF played a limited role seeing as Georgia possessed a limited naval
presence and most of the fighting took place far from the Black Sea‘s coast.
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One of the few specific indicators about the Russian Navy available is Russian
shipbuilding capacity. While a few ships and submarines have been constructed or
completed since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian shipbuilding capability has
severely diminished as highlighted by the recent decision by the Russian military to
purchase four French designed Mistral-class amphibious assault ships.249 Two will be
built on French territory and two on Russian with each consecutive ship being built
increasingly using Russian labor.250 Ideally, this should allow for Russian workers to gain
the necessary construction skills and abilities that can be later transferred to domestic
warship construction. In addition, as proof that the Russian shipbuilding industry lacks
the capability to produce such advanced warships is the announcement by the Russian
government that a new shipyard will be constructed in St. Petersburg for the express
purpose of constructing the latter two Mistrals.251
Without further detailed evidence it is difficult to reach any specific conclusions
concerning the effectiveness of the Russian Navy. However, it may be the lack of
evidence that can provide a more general assessment of Russian naval capability. The
few number of naval patrols conducted every year; the slow construction rates and
additions of new warships to the Russian fleets; and the low budgetary priority of the
VMF, especially during the 1990s, can lead one to assume that the capabilities of the
Russian navy have severely atrophied and will take time to rebuild assuming proper
funding allocation.
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Conventional Needs
Despite the benefits of nuclear weapons and even assuming that the Russian
Federation was willing to broaden the conditions under which they would be employed,
the priority of Russian military reform over the last decade has consistently focused on
reform and modernization of its conventional military forces. Russia‘s leaders realize that
nuclear weapons are currently limited to a few select and specific missions. Although
these are very important missions, the chance of their use is very low in the current global
environment. Russia‘s leaders realize that conventional forces provide a strong measure
of flexible response. Therefore, while Russian reliance on nuclear weapons will increase
as time goes by, this does not mean that Russia‘s leaders have decided to abandon
conventional capability.
The Russian leadership has unveiled several reform programs over the years that
have targeted all three conventional military branches. These reforms have called for
major downsizing of military forces, elimination of conscription and professionalization
of forces, and the introduction of modern weapons to reflect the changes in modern
technology in the post-Cold War era. In a March 5, 2010 speech to the Defense Ministry
Collegium, President Medvedev called for ―renewing arms and equipment at a rate of 9
to 11 percent per year for the next decade, in order to reach a target of modernizing 70
percent of the military equipment by 2020.‖252 The likelihood of achieving this goal will
be difficult as the current rate of renewal is less than two percent and even the Soviet
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Union averaged only a 5 to 7 percent rate during the 1980s.253 In order to achieve this
goal, the Defense Ministry has put together a new modernization plan titled the State
Armaments Program (SAP) 2020 which outlines procurement priorities for the next
decade from 2011 through 2020. However, the SAP has not been publicly released (and
probably will not be) and any information available is based on public statements or data
leaked to the public.

State Armaments Modernization Program
The budget for this armaments program is listed as 20 trillion rubles ($650.56
billion) and almost a quarter, 4.7 trillion rubles ($150.7 billion), is allocated for naval
modernization.254 This modernization plan is ―three times more than is allocated in the
existing 2007-2015 program.‖255 One third of the funding is expected to be provided by
2015.256 Part of the reason for such a large budget is the Russian government‘s
recognition of graft, corruption, and mismanagement within defense procurement.
―Various press reports estimate that as much as half of all procurement money is spent on
bribes and other forms of corruption.‖257 Therefore, it is necessary to provide more
funding to overcome the money that ―disappears‖ due to these causes. The ability to fund
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this program in its totality assumes that government revenues from oil, natural gas, and
other natural resources will continue which is not guaranteed considering the volatility of
these markets. Overall, SAP 2020 is a very ambitious armaments program and if
successful would go a long way toward modernizing Russian forces and improving the
technical quality of its military equipment. This is critically important due to the obsolete
nature of much of the equipment, in many cases its poor quality, and use past official
service life.
All three conventional military branches are slated to receive new equipment. The
Air Force is expected to be the main beneficiary of this new armaments program with the
navy and ground forces considered lesser priorities.258
The Ministry of Defense believes it can modernize all of the country‘s military
aircraft over the next ten years. The goal is to purchase 350 new fighter airplanes,
1,000 new helicopters, and a number of new transport aircraft. This is a high
priority as most of the existing aircraft have reached or exceeded their original
lifespan.259
Specific air force procurement plans include the purchase of a total of 50 to 60 T-50 fifthgeneration fighter aircraft. This fighter aircraft is the Russian Federation‘s response to the
United State‘s development of the F-22 Raptor, a next generation air superiority fighter.
In addition, the VVS would procure
Su-35BM fourth-generation fighter aircraft. Forty-eight to be purchased in
2010-2015.
Su-34 fighter-bomber. Thirty-two to be purchased in 2010-2015.
MiG-35 fighter. Currently in development. First units expected to enter the air
force in 2013.
Yak-130 training aircraft. One hundred fifty to be delivered in 2010-2015. An
additional fifty to be procured in 2016-2020.
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An-124 transport aircraft. Twenty to be purchased in 2015-2020. Ten to be
modernized in 2011-2020.
An-70 transport aircraft. Sixty to be purchased in 2011-2020.
Mi-26 transport helicopters. Exact number unknown. Main focus of helicopter
renewal program. 260
Russian air defenses are also expected to receive new equipment with the purchase of
additional S-400 air defense systems. ―The goal is to have as many as 23 regiments (of 8
to 12 missiles each) by 2015.‖261 The S-400 will be supported with S-500 systems
currently under development and expected to be ready for production by 2013.
Both the S-400 and S-500 systems are superior to the U.S. Patriot PAC-3 in
maximum speed, range, and accuracy.262
Meanwhile, at least officially, the Russian Navy is expected to see a vast increase
in the number of new ships in its fleet. This includes the beefing up of Russian
conventional submarine capability to include two to five new Yasen-class multi-purpose
attack submarines, two to seven Lada-class diesel submarines, and potentially several
additional Kilo-class submarines.263 The number of surface combat ships the Russian
military intends to add to its fleet is extremely ambitious. No less than 30 new ships that
include destroyers, corvettes, landing craft, aircraft carriers, the Mistral-class helicopter
assault ship, and two classes of frigates.264 Besides these new construction projects, the
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SAP outlines the intent to refit and modernize several previously mothballed Kirov- and
Slava-class cruisers.265
Much less is known regarding modernization plans for the ground forces under
the SAP, however, it is expected to receive the least amount of funding. It is known that
―the military has canceled plans to procure the T-95 battle tank and will instead continue
to purchase T-90 tanks for the foreseeable future.‖266 Some other additional equipment
may be purchased but what kind and how much is unclear. However,
the Russian military will focus on improving its communications
capabilities by upgrading its GLONASS satellite system and procuring
new digital communications and command and control systems, as well as
other high-tech items such as night vision equipment and better IFF
(Identify Friend or Foe) systems. Many of these items are likely to be
procured abroad or developed with foreign assistance.267
The decision to invest in this kind of equipment can be clearly traced back to the
problems faced by Russian ground forces during the Georgian campaign and can be seen
as a reflection of lessons learned.
Nuclear forces have not been ignored by the SAP modernization program and
there are several new acquisitions expected to occur along with conventional
procurement. First, the navy is expected to construct a total of eight Borey-class SSBNs
by 2015.268 The Yuri Dolgoruky, the first Borey of in this class, is already completed and
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undergoing sea trials and another three are in various stages of construction.269 However,
the continued problems with the Bulava SLBM may delay further construction of the
Borey since it was designed specifically to accommodate it. While the Bulava may seem
too big to fail, if further testing of the missile continues to leave the Navy uncertain about
its reliability, then further Borey construction may have to be halted. In essence, the
Borey and Bulava are a package deal and the Navy will not accept one without the other.
The SAP did include a provision for a next-generation long-range bomber, but on
February 24, 2011, First Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin, head of
procurement, announced that it would push back the development of a new bomber to a
later date and continue to depend on the Tu-95 Bears and Tu-160 Blackjacks. The Bears
and Blackjacks are expected to remain in service until 2030. As a concession for delaying
a new bomber, the current Bear and Blackjack fleet is expected to be refit and
modernized with new avionics and equipment.270 Finally, the Strategic Missile Forces
will continue along their current modernization program which includes the continued
retirement of SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs and their replacement with new Topol-M (SS-27s)
and RS-24 Yars ICBMs.271
Despite these grand modernization goals, it should be noted that this procurement
plan targets only the equipment and not the soldiers, sailors, and airmen who will be
operating it. There is currently no known comprehensive training and education plan
outlined for Russian military personnel and equipment is only as good as those who
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operate it. Even the most advanced weaponry can be ineffective or useless if soldiers or
sailors are insufficiently educated and trained on how to use it properly, and integrate it
with other systems and other military branches. Therefore, even if the Russian military is
able to reach its goal of 70% modern equipment by 2020 it does not mean that the
equipment will be employed to its fullest potential. This will be a major problem as
sufficient training funds are still difficult to obtain and conscripts will have a year or less
in which to train on their equipment. Also, the quality of education that conscripts enter
with has been steadily decreasing while the technical know-how necessary to operate new
equipment has been on the rise.
As the SAP will not be released to the public, it is difficult to know how accurate
the procurement and construction objectives listed above are. The types of vehicles and
numbers listed above are not complete and may be subject to change. In addition, the
goals outlined in the SAP are very ambitious and should not be taken at face value. One
can assume that there may be a classified, more conservative, SAP internal document that
reflects more achievable, realistic, and sustainable goals.
The likely existence of such a document is best highlighted by the goals for naval
modernization. These goals in particular appear to be wildly optimistic about Russian
construction capabilities considering the current status and slow pace of the shipbuilding
industry in Russia. As stated, warships are complex, expensive, time consuming
construction projects and this is compounded by the fact that the Russian shipbuilding
industry suffers from graft, corruption, a lack of skilled workmen, weak shipyard
infrastructure, and requires long construction rates.
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The idea that the Russian shipbuilding industry could produce ten Admiral
Gorshkov-class frigates, several Krivak IV-frigates, ten Steregushchii-class corvettes, and
another five to ten destroyers all by 2020 is highly doubtful. This does not even include
the official SAP‘s reference to the construction of at least three aircraft carriers, although
a specific time table is no included for their commissioning. If these goals are even half
true, then they assume a substantial improvement in Russian warship construction
capabilities that at this time do not appear to exist. Either these stated goals are purely for
domestic and foreign propaganda purposes and the Russian leadership has a more
realistic outlook on its abilities, or they assume they can overcome these shortcomings
with enough political pressure and money. The only other explanation is that Russia‘s
leaders fail to grasp the reality of the obstacles facing the military industry which is
difficult to believe with both the Borey and Bulava standing out as prime examples of the
industry‘s weaknesses.
Regardless of whether or not one assumes that the procurement goals in the SAP
are real, there will still be a corresponding increase in reliance on nuclear weapons. If the
goals are real and achieved by 2020, questions regarding the quality and capabilities of
the equipment and appropriate training will still remain as major issues. If the goals are
not real or fail to be achieved by 2020 then there will continue to remain a shortage of
new equipment and Russian conventional forces will be forced to continue to operate
equipment that is obsolete, poorly maintained, and subject to failure. In either case,
nuclear weapons provide the necessarily support and backup to the conventional forces to
make up the difference where conventional forces fall short.
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Issues with the Domestic Defense Industry
The Russian government has finally decided to take a firm stand with the defense
establishment and begun to intervene more readily in their operations in an attempt to
improve their performance after years of poor results. In response to corruption,
incompetence and shoddy workmanship, especially in naval construction, the Kremlin
has started firing people.272 In addition, the Russian government
has begun reorganizing entire sectors of the defense industry under unified
aegises, such as the United Aircraft Building Corp. and the United Shipbuilding
Corp…[however]…[t]o what extent these efforts will succeed remains to be
seen.273
The Russian government has clearly outlined a very ambitious procurement and
modernization plan and if even half of items in this document are realized it will
represent a significant improvement of the Russian military, at least in respect to the
relative quality of equipment compared to what they operate now. However, the Defense
Ministry has proposed ambitious targets in the past and failed to reach them due to
bureaucratic inertia, corruption, political in-fighting, and lack of funding. An
announcement by the Audit Chamber stated that ―one billion rubles of military
procurement money was lost to corruption in 2009.‖274 The ambitious attempt to
professionalize the ground forces is another example that fell flat and is considered all but
a failure.
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Even assuming that the planned modernization was successful in reaching its
target numbers for deployment of new vehicles and equipment, the quality of the
equipment is also in question. Discounting the kinds of production failures characterized
by the Bulava missile, quality and capability of the new ―modern‖ Russian equipment in
comparison to Western weapons will be a major concern. The Russian defense
establishment all but collapsed following the break-up of the Soviet Union when defense
orders dried up. Defense industry production equipment and manpower has severely
atrophied over the last 20 years.
The best workers – those left over from Soviet times when the industry was well
funded and a highly prestigious sector in which to works – have retired or are
about to do so. Few good people went into the field in the 1990s, when there was
virtually no financing and the industry came close to collapse.275
Those that the defense industry would like to recruit have all pursued more successful,
higher paying positions in the private sector or abroad. This left the defense establishment
unable to recruit the next generation of specialists, leaving it unprepared to meet the
demand to produce the kinds of sophisticated and advanced types of weapons and
technology needed for the next generation of warfare.
At the same time, because there was no money for equipment modernization, the
industrial plant[s] began to deteriorate. By the start of the Putin presidency, even
the allocation of additional financing was not enough to counteract the decline in
the defense industry‘s ability to produce high quality products. This decline will
have to be reversed if the Russian military is to be successful in producing new
high-tech military equipment.276
This is most likely the primary reason that the Russian government has turned to
purchasing advanced weapons systems like the Mistral and UAVs abroad. Purchasing
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weapons systems abroad will help Russia overcome many of the problems associated
with its attempts at defense modernization. Purchasing weapons designed and built by
foreign defense contractors allows the Russian government to save massive amounts of
time and money that would have been spent on domestic research and development,
testing, and production. All that needs to be provided is the funding and the Russian
military receives reliable, high-quality, high-tech weapons much faster than if they were
produced domestically. In some cases, as with the Mistral, the Russian government will
also be permitted to purchase the license to some of the weapons systems it acquires,
allowing it to legally reverse engineer the technology and produce it domestically.
However, the Russian government realizes that each weapon procured abroad is at
the expense of the domestic defense establishment. Also, there is a limit to just how
advanced the technology it purchases will be, which leaves it no choice but to try and
develop the technology and weapons platforms domestically. This brings Russia back to
the current obstacles it faces in developing and deploying weapons and technology of
sufficient capability, quality, quantity, and reliability amongst the conventional forces to
ensure their ability to confront another conventionally armed foe. If they are unable to do
so currently and in the near future, then once again, nuclear weapons provide an effective
means of overcoming the conventional weakness. This is not to say that the SAP 2020
will fail but past attempts at reform have failed, examples like the Bulava demonstrate
Russian difficulty with developing certain advanced weapons, and the problems posed by
corruption are unlikely to go away any time soon. Therefore, the Russian ability to
produce and deploy the necessary conventional equipment may take longer than the 2020
benchmark, leaving nuclear weapons as Russia‘s only defense guarantee.
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Making Up the Short Fall
The multitude of examples listed above demonstrates that each branch of Russia‘s
conventional forces carries with it serious deficiencies. Obsolete technology, slow
production and under-deployment of modern equipment, and undertrained soldiers and
sailors cannot be overcome quickly or cheaply. As equipment and personnel continue to
deteriorate, the effectiveness of Russia‘s conventional forces will increasingly be called
into question by other nations, Russia‘s allies, and Russia‘s own public. The domestic
defense industry‘s current inability to produce the quality of weapons needed for the 21st
century is also a major concern for a military still configured for mass warfare. The
observed and demonstrated weaknesses and failures of Russia‘s conventional forces in
the Georgian War only reinforce the importance that nuclear weapons will play into
Russian defense planning.
Although the Strategic Missile Forces and other two legs of the nuclear triad
require modernization and upgrades as well, they constitute a much smaller overall
percentage of the Russian military. A smaller investment in the nuclear triad yields a
much more significant advantage in terms of deterrence, retaliation, and destructive
capability. So long as modern nuclear weapons continue to exist in Russia‘s arsenal, and
reliable delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons are available, then the failures and
deficiencies of conventional forces can be offset. The next section will explore the
capabilities of the Russian nuclear triad in greater detail.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR TRIAD
Russian nuclear forces have fared better than conventional forces since the
collapse of the Soviet Union. One reason for this was political, as the Defense Minister
appointed by Yeltsin in 1997, Igor Sergeyev, was a former commander of the Strategic
Missile Forces (SMF). Therefore, his favoritism toward his former branch colored his
perception of Russia‘s military priorities resulting is larger amounts of funding being
allocated to maintaining and modernizing Russia‘s nuclear forces. Another factor that
contributed to the improved state of the SMF was the fact that they constituted a much
smaller force in comparison to the other branches and a smaller percentage of defense
spending had a more significant impact. As of 2000, defense spending on strategic forces
only constituted 13 percent of the overall defense budget.277 In addition, planned
reductions of nuclear weapons and forces under the START treaties allow for more
funding to maintain fewer weapons and personnel. Finally, with the general perception by
government and military officials within the country that Russia is militarily weak,
nuclear weapons provided the kind of guarantee that would deter any would-be
adversary. Therefore, there is a need to maintain the one weapon in Russia‘s arsenal that
was a sure means of defending the state.
Nuclear weapons possessed other qualities that made them appealing to Russia‘s
leaders, at least temporarily as a ―stop-gap‖ measure until the state was able to recover
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and return investment to conventional forces. For all the destructive potential contained
in even one nuclear weapon, they are relatively cheap, reliable, exist in mass quantities,
possess multiple redundancies through air, sea, and land based delivery vehicles,
represent a capability that can only be matched by a handful of other nations, and their
SLBMs and ICBMs can strike a target anywhere in the world in less than an hour of the
order to launch being given. No other weapon in the Russian arsenal can respond as
quickly with such destructive power. Moreover, with proper maintenance, nuclear
weapons have service lives of decades. The weapons themselves do not have morale,
require salaries or benefits, and cannot mutiny. Attempting to construct a commensurate
conventional force with equally destructive power and global reach would be heinously
expensive and far beyond Russia‘s current financial and technical capability.
In other words, nuclear weapons were viewed as [a] cost-effective alternative to
more expensive and time-consuming conventional modernization. They were also
seen as a response to the qualitatively and quantitatively superior conventional
forces of NATO.‖278
For the Russian leadership, the benefits boiled down to the fact that nuclear weapons
allowed them to do more with less and this is still true today.
Finally, beyond their obvious military benefits, nuclear weapons imbue the
Russian Federation with Great Power status in global affairs. Any country can have a
large conventional military, but nuclear weapons allow the Russian Federation to stand
apart with a select number of states with literally the power to destroy the world. With the
collapse of the Soviet Union, major losses of territory and severe cuts to its military, the
Russian Federation was not about to give up such a major status symbol. In fact, nuclear
weapons remain Russia‘s only remaining claim to superpower status other than its natural
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resources and geographic size. They also allow Russia to remain relevant in international
affairs by using their nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip and allow them a surefire
means of maintaining the attention of other powers and preventing themselves from being
marginalized in the post-Cold War era. This remains as true in 2011 as it did in 1991.
The benefits of nuclear weapons and the deficiencies of Russia‘s conventional
forces outlined above represent a great part of why the Russian Federation will continue
to rely on nuclear weapons in the future. However, that is not to say that Russia‘s nuclear
weapons do not hold their own problems and inherent inefficiencies. The first and most
obvious of which is that barring a global war, a direct threat to the survival of the Russian
Federation, or the employment of weapons of mass destruction against Russian forces or
territory, that nuclear weapons are overkill. Russia has become deeply integrated into the
global economy and international affairs. As a result, its leaders must take into account
how their actions and policies will be perceived by allies, trading partners, and other
states and their potential response(s). Russia also views itself as a Great Power with a
corresponding international responsibility signified by its status as a member of the
United Nations Security Council and a nuclear power. Even the use of nuclear weapons
in Russia‘s ―near abroad‖ would be counterproductive.
Leaving aside any moral and ethical aspects of a nuclear strike against Ukraine or
the other neighboring republics (that have, incidentally, 25 million ethnic
Russians on their territories), from a purely military point of view a nuclear option
would be absurd. These states would not under any circumstances be capable of
mobilizing victorious offensive conventional operations against Russia, that might
justify nuclear a response. On the other hand, if Russia attacks them with
conventional forces, it would be senseless to use nuclear weapons against the
territory and population, which Russia hypothetically might want to occupy. In
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most cases if military conflict occurs Moscow may face only guerrilla-type
warfare, for which nuclear force is neither required, nor effective.279
Therefore, Russia realizes that it must proceed with caution when undertaking certain
actions. Employing nuclear weapons or the threat to use them in most cases will be a
disproportionate use of force and will quickly isolate the Russian Federation and
potentially discredit it.
For these reasons, starting with the presidency of Vladimir Putin, there has been a
strong emphasis on trying to reform and modernize Russia‘s conventional forces because
the leadership realized that nuclear weapons are essentially useless in local or regional
conflicts such as Chechnya or against Georgia. They also realized that the prevalence of
these conflicts is likely to increase over time. Furthermore, since the end of the Cold War,
the United States has demonstrated the effectiveness of conventional forces in Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Kosovo with the development of new technologies such as UAVs and
precision-guided munitions. These weapons have provided the United States with
numerous conventional alternatives that have allowed it to wage war across vast distances
and defeat heavily armed foes much quicker than previously believed possible. Especially
with the rising threat from insurgent and terrorist groups in Russia and along its
periphery, nuclear weapons do not represent a realistically viable weapon, at least not
without significant political and economic repercussions. However, while the useful
scope within which the use of nuclear weapons are acceptable is very narrow (i.e.
survival of the Russian state/global war), it should also be remembered that those are the
conditions under which nuclear weapons are the most necessary and effective.
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The second major issue regarding Russia's nuclear weapons is that, like the three
conventional military forces, Russia‘s nuclear forces are plagued by aging equipment and
a slow rate of modernization. The Strategic Missile Forces are probably in the best shape
in regards to the modernization of it arsenal simply due to their smaller size. Yet, as of
2006,
[o]ver 80 percent of Russia‘s silo-based ICBMS have exceeded their original
service lives, and plans to replace them with new missiles have been stymied by
failed tests and low rates of production.280
The Russian military has been forced to extend the service life of Russia‘s aging ICBMs
while they decommission older models and replace them with new variants, however
extensions cannot continue indefinitely.281 Older missiles are already being
decommissioning faster than they can be replaced.282
The vast majority of Russia‘s land-based deliverable warheads are carried on
older SS-18 ―Satan‖ and SS-19 ―Stiletto‖ missiles — all of which (save a reserve
force of about 30 SS-19s) have already undergone sustainment programs to
extend their already-surpassed intended service lives [See Figure 3].283
In addition, as of January 2011 the Russian Defense Ministry appears to be intent
to developing a new generation of heavy ICBM to ensure that they are armed with the
newest nuclear weapons and avoid the need for repeated service extensions. Production
rates for new missiles are still slow, less than a dozen each year, due to limited financing
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Figure 3. Image in ―Russia: Sustaining the Strategic Deterrent,‖ Stratfor: Global Intelligence, December
11, 2007, http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/russia_sustaining_strategic_deterrent.

and long lead times necessary for design, testing, and approval.284 However, Prime
Minister Putin announced in March 2011 that Russia would double ballistic missile
production starting in 2013.285 Therefore, the Defense Ministry‘s early action may be an
attempt to get a head start on overcoming these obstacles especially when official
statements maintain that many of the oldest missiles may remain in the arsenal until 2030
with current service extensions.

Sea Leg
Meanwhile, Russia‘s nuclear ballistic submarines and SLBMs represent the
weakest leg of the nuclear triad. ―At its peak, the Soviet navy operated more than 60
284
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SSBNs. The fleet is now one-quarter that size, and most of the boats are in poor
condition.‖286 Russia‘s strategic submarine fleet has also performed fewer deterrent
patrols each year with only five in 2006 and three in 2007.287
In comparison, the U.S. Navy conducts 50 or more such patrols annually. In the
late 1980s, the Soviets conducted even more. This reversal of a slow climb from
zero patrols in 2002 highlights the trouble Russia is still having with the sea-based
leg of its nuclear deterrent.288
It also reflects poorly on the quality of training that submarine crews have on ballistic
missile submarines.
The symbol of Russian naval weakness is the Bulava SLBM. It is Russia‘s first
attempt to develop a solid-fuel SLBM and has been continuously plagued by test failures.
The Bulava has been in development and testing for over a decade yet is still not ready
for deployment. Since 2005, there have been fourteen test launches of the Bulava, yet
more than half have been considered failures either because of partial or total failure of
the missile.289 The deployment date for the Bulava has been consistently pushed back,
most recently to the start of 2012, which has called into question the future of Russia‘s
naval deterrent. Furthermore, due to its size, the Bulava can only be carried by the new
Borey-class submarine which was redesigned to solely to carry the Bulava.
Along with the Bulava, the Borey-class submarine, which will carry the Bulava,
has suffered from its own setbacks. The first Borey was laid down in 1996, and as of
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2011, although commissioned, has not yet finished sea trials and a firm date for its
deployment is contingent on the acceptance of the Bulava by the Navy. The Borey and
the Bulava together represent the next generation of Russia‘s nuclear naval triad. Due to
the fact that both systems have been designed for each other, the importance of each
project is magnified. There are currently no other SSBNs or SLBMs in development.
Both projects must be successful if the Russian Federation hopes to maintain a viable sea
leg deterrent.
The delays and technical difficulties surrounding both of these projects require
some context. Initial delays in completing the Borey were due to neglect and lack of
funding during the 1990s.290 Later it was necessary to conduct extensive modification of
the Borey to accommodate the Bulava SLBM design.291 As for the Bulava, the failures in
production and testing have more to do with quality control of components than a
problem with design. It should be noted that this is the first attempt by the Moscow
Institute of Thermal Technology (MITT), the company responsible for the design and
production of the Bulava, to produce an SLBM. MITT is previously responsible for the
successful design of the ground based Topol (NATO reporting code SS-25 ―Sickle‖),
Topol-M (NATO reporting code SS-27 ―Sickle B‖), and RS-24 Yars ICBMs.
The inability of the Russian military to get both the Borey and the Bulava into
production and deployment represents a major security risk due to the importance that
SSBNs play in any country‘s nuclear triad. SSBNs with their SLBM arsenals can act as
both first-strike or second-strike platforms. Their role as second-strike is much more
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important because it is difficult to locate and destroy SSBNs hidden beneath the ocean‘s
surface that are constantly on the move. Also, their SLBMs can ―be fired from various
points of the compass and [have] the speed of ballistic missiles, not bombers.‖292
Therefore, in the event of an attack on the Russian Federation that eliminates its ground
based ICBMs and strategic air force, Russia could retaliate with SLBM launches. If
Russia is unable to get the Borey and Bulava into deployment, it will undermine this
second-strike capability and leave Russia vulnerable. Getting both of these systems into
deployment is imperative as the strategic fleet is expected to carry at least 30 percent of
Russia‘s nuclear arsenal by 2015.293

Strategic Bombers
Finally, Russia‘s strategic bomber fleet represents the last leg of its nuclear triad,
and despite the deficiencies and age of the Tu-95s and Tu-160s mentioned above, it has
proven itself to be reliable, especially in comparison to the naval leg. It is probably the
most well trained of the triad flying ―more than 100 strategic bomber patrols over
Russia's eastern, western and northern periphery in 2006,‖ which also included mid-air
refueling.294 However, in relation to the Russia‘s ICBMs and SLBMs it is much weaker
because its payload takes longer to deliver either as gravity bombs or as air launched
cruise missiles and they are only able to carry missiles with a single warhead. Bombers
are also more vulnerable to interception by enemy air forces and air defenses and they are
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currently located at only a few air bases making their locations predictable and therefore
vulnerable to preemptive strike.
The greatest weakness of the current bomber fleet is obviously its deterioration
due to age and lack of proper maintenance. Unless the Russian government invests
heavily in repairs or replacement of the current bomber fleet, it may lose this leg of the
triad simply due to the age of the equipment. Unfortunately, there are currently no new
strategic bombers (either of current of new design) scheduled to enter into service any
time soon. A next-generation strategic bomber was included in the new State Armaments
Program but has since been pushed back. Currently only a preliminary sketch is expected
around 2015. There is talk of restarting production of the Tu-160; however, this plan is
uncertain ―as it took three years for the Kazan airplant to assemble the bomber that was
added to the fleet in April 2008.‖295 Some might argue that the elimination of the
strategic bomber fleet could be a positive outcome due to its lesser capability in
comparison to SLBMs/ICBMs and as a cost saving measure. However, the fact remains
that in repeated tests and training exercises the strategic bombers have performed
successfully. Moreover, the long-range bombers possess a high demonstration value with
their periodic flights in the North Atlantic and Pacific airspace.296 It would be difficult to
justify their elimination as a cost-saving measure especially in the face of the current
weaknesses displayed by the naval triad and its questionable future.
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Tactical Nuclear Weapons
The difference between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons has not been
emphasized here because the Russian Federation is likely to rely on both types of
weapons simultaneously. However, the significance of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs)
will be mentioned here as it relates to Russia‘s nuclear dependence. Russia‘s TNWs
primarily consist of short-range nuclear weapons that could be used it a conflict in
Russia‘s ―near abroad‖ or along the RF‘s periphery. It is likely that the military exercises
Zapad-99 and Stability 2008 that escalated into nuclear conflicts both employed TNWs.
Because of their range limitations they are not considered strategic (i.e. able to strike the
United States) and therefore are not bound by the nuclear weapons reduction and
limitation treaties such as New START. In addition to short-range missiles, Russia‘s
stockpile of TNWs also consists of nuclear landmines and artillery shells.297 The United
States has sought to engage the RF on TNWs and negotiate a weapons reduction treaty
similar to New START; however, the Russian Federation has thus far refused.298
Russia‘s refusal to do so is greatly due to the fact that it holds a significant
numerical advantage against the United States in TNWs. Meanwhile, the United States
holds the advantage is strategic weapons. TNWs fit perfectly into Russia‘s current mindset and threat perception regarding external threats and the fear of invasion. Should an
attack come along any front of the RF, then TNWs are suited to deterring or defeating
that foe. Nuclear landmines could be laid in the path of invading forces to deter or
destroy their advance, and short-range TNWs could target enemy forces massed along
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Russia‘s border. This would make any adversary wary of employing ground troops
against the RF and if their goal was to acquire territory then the fear would be that they
could accidentally trigger such a weapon and contaminate the region.
The fact that TNWs are not covered by any treaty provides Russia with a
substantial advantage. First, it places no limits on Russia‘s ability to produce these types
of weapons and have them labeled as ―tactical.‖ Even though they may be limited in
range they could still be delivered against a far-off target if they could be staged close
enough, such as on the territory of a Russian ally (like during the Cuban Missile Crisis in
1962). They could also be delivered by an alternative platform. A strategic bomber or
submarine that gets close enough could be armed with such weapons. Second, if the RF
were to employ TNWs in a conflict, then it would be able to conserve the number of
strategic weapons it maintains to deter the United States or other nuclear powers. (The
ability to conserve these weapons is pertinent due to the current slow rate of production
for nuclear weapons in Russia.) This will become especially relevant as the number of
strategic nuclear weapons on both sides continues to decrease as prescribed by current
treaties. Therefore, as Russia‘s strategic nuclear deterrent decreases, it will be able to
compensate with a robust stockpile of TNWs.
Finally, TNWs provide Russia a solution to its concern that it may be approaching
a threshold it cannot go below regarding how many strategic nuclear weapons it can
maintain without compromising its ability to penetrate an anti-ballistic missile shield. So
long as Russia refuses to reduce its TNWs, it can always augment its nuclear forces, such
as its strategic bombers, with weapons that officially would be designated as ―tactical.‖
While there would be some sacrificed in capability, it is a potential loophole that the RF
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could still exploit. Also, by decreasing its strategic nuclear weapons, Russia may weaken
its ability to successful target and deter the United States; retaliate against the United
States following a first strike (which would primarily target Russia‘s strategic weapons to
protect the U.S. homeland and leave Russia‘s TNWs in better shape); or penetrate an
anti-ballistic missile system.
However, TNWs would allow Russia to retaliate against the United States
indirectly. There are numerous U.S. military installations around the globe within range
of Russia‘s TNWs that could be threatened. More importantly, Russia‘s TNWs could be
employed against the U.S.‘s European allies (which also maintain U.S. bases and
personnel) as retaliation or to hold them hostage to deter U.S. action. Therefore, even if
the United States could protect itself with an effective anti-ballistic missile shield from
Russia retaliation, it would have to be willing to risk sacrificing its allies and U.S.
personnel abroad. Even if NATO countries had an effective anti-ballistic missile system,
it could be overwhelmed using Russia‘s arsenal of TNWs. Therefore, Russia may come
to rely more on its tactical nuclear weapons for its national security to compensate for
reductions in its strategic stockpile. Regardless of whether they are strategic or tactical,
Russia‘s reliance on nuclear weapons will persist.

Nuclear Counterarguments
The strongest counterargument that can be proposed to this thesis is that a state
cannot be wholly reliant on nuclear weapons. A state‘s willingness to use (or threaten to
use) nuclear weapons loosely would be counterproductive due to the weapon‘s inability
to distinguish between civilian and military targets, the wide destruction wrought by even
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a single detonation, and the radiological aftereffects to the target environment. Nuclear
weapons also run up against a fundamental issue with their practical application to certain
scenarios such as terrorism and weapons proliferation.
Therefore, conventional forces provide states with a much more measured,
effective, and flexible response with significantly reduced political and economic fallout
versus retaliating with a nuclear weapon. There is no denying this. However, it is
necessary to take into account Russian threat perceptions and the facts on the ground
surrounding Russian current and future military prospects. Russia‘s leaders have a history
of outside invasion, a Cold War history in which they spent forty years under constant
hair-trigger alert of nuclear war, and had the power of its military forces severely
diminished following the breakup of the Soviet Union.
Meanwhile, the Russian government has thus far been unable to institute broad
and effective military reform and modernization, and the defense industry is still unable
to produce the kinds of weapon and technology that has been demonstrated by its rivals
and will be necessary if it intends to remain a relevant military power in the 21st Century.
The Russian government is charged with defending the largest state in the world with
tens of thousands of miles of border and coastline from a variety of threats spread out
along its periphery with scarce military resources. And these military resources are not
expected to substantially improve either in quantity or quality over time. This is
especially true regarding military manpower as population decline due to numerous
reasons reduces the number of eligible applicants for military service. If the trend in
military decline continues then the only option left available to Russia‘s leadership will
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be a reliance on nuclear weapons and the potential to reevaluate and broaden the scope in
which their use is acceptable.

Nuclear Consequences
Although the use of nuclear weapons in anger has not occurred since Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, the use of nuclear weapons by Russia is not beyond the realm of
imagination. While, their use against another nuclear power is extremely unlikely due to
the consequences of a retaliatory strike, their use domestically, against a non-nuclear
threat (state or non-state actor), or use in a demonstration detonation are possible.
Conventional wisdom would argue that the use of nuclear weapons in a conflict, either
domestically or on foreign soil, against a non-nuclear threat would have political,
economic, and international ramifications greater than any benefit that the use of nuclear
weapons might yield. In most cases this would be true; however, Russia holds a unique
position in global affairs and possesses several characteristics that may insulate or
mitigate it from these consequences if it were to employ its nuclear weapons.
First, Russia‘s energy reserves and its role as a major energy exporter provide it
with substantial leverage over the global energy market. All of Europe is dependent on
Russian oil and natural gas either directly or indirectly which would make it impossible
for European states to sanction and isolate Russia because they would be crippling their
own economies at the same time (See Figure 4). The Baltic States in particular are at
Russia‘s mercy when it comes to energy.
Russia provides the entirety of the Baltic countries‘ natural gas supplies,
which are exported via the Yamal pipeline system. Russia provides 99 percent of
crude oil to Lithuania, the only Baltic country with a refinery. Russia also
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provides 46 percent of Lithuania‘s refined oil products imports, as well as 23
percent and 11 percent of total supplies to Estonia and Latvia, respectively…
As for electricity, Estonia and Latvia are net exporters. Lithuania,
however, imported nearly half of its electricity from Russia in 2010…299
Meanwhile, with the completion of the Nord Stream pipeline under the Baltic Sea, Russia
will soon provide energy directly to Germany, the largest economy in all of Europe and a
major power player in the European community. Turkey is also heavily dependent on
Russian natural gas through the Blue Stream pipeline and countries such as the Baltic
states and other Eastern and Central European states are heavily dependent on Russian
energy supplies. Meanwhile, Russia can retaliate against sanctions by disrupting pipelines
and transportation routes along its periphery such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, BakuSupsa, and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipelines that passes through the Caucasus‘s.
Even assuming that the European economies were willing to undertake such
economically crippling action and they could find alternative sources of oil and natural
gas, it would have the consequence of driving up the global price of oil and gas further
hurting the economies of Europe. Beyond energy exports, Russia is a major trading
partner and market for numerous European states and any sanction or embargo against
doing business with the Russian Federation would also be damaging to the European
economy. Therefore, it would be very difficult for European countries to undertake
sustained and sever enough action(s) to punish the Russian Federation for its use of
nuclear weapons without damaging consequences to themselves.
Second, the Russian Federation‘s position as member of the UN Security Council
would allow it to block and veto any sanctions or resolutions directed against it. Third,
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the West, and the United States in particular, is involved in many international pursuits
and endeavors almost all of which require Russia as an active participant, or least as a
neutral party. U.S. desire to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan, resolve the issues over Iran‘s
and North Korea‘s nuclear programs, enforce non-proliferation and arms control policies,
and combat international terrorism – among other things – all require Russian
participation or support. If the United States were to level sanctions or condemnation
against the Russia Federation or even break off relation as punishment, then the Russia
Federation could be a serious agitator and disruptor of U.S. objectives abroad. The
Russian Federation could even withdrawal from certain key treaties related to arms
reduction (SALT, SORT, START, etc.) and spur a new arms race. This would undo
decades of nuclear reduction policies and force the United States to respond in kind.
Furthermore, such a breakdown in relations between Russia and the United States would
also reignite Cold War mentalities on both sides, validate Russia‘s threat perception, and
damage long-term relations. The United States needs the Russian Federation‘s active or
passive support if it wants to succeed in its foreign policies and therefore would be hard
pressed to enforce meaningful long-term punishments against it.
Despite the dependence that Europe, the United States, and the rest of the world
have on Russia, there would still be costly consequences for the use of nuclear weapons.
First, it will greatly hurt Russia‘s status in global affairs as it will have violated the
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) if employed against a non-nuclear state. Second,
it would be damaging economically by driving away foreign investors and even shortterm reductions in trade would damage the Russian economy. In particular, if foreign
countries were willing to undertake an embargo and reduce their imports of Russian
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Figure 4. Image from ―European Dependence on Russian Natural Gas‖ (Stratfor: Global Intelligence,
March 3, 2010), http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100303_russia_croatia_courting_zagreb_energy.
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goods and resources, then the Russian economy and government revenues would be hurt
as natural gas and oil exports constitute a large portion of these. In 2006, oil and gas
sector‘s share of the federal budget was 49 percent and accounted for 63 percent of
exports.300 The resulting volatility in the energy market, although increasing the price of
energy, would also make alternative energy more cost effective and could spur countries
dependent on Russian gas and oil to seek renewable alternatives to protect themselves.
A nuclear first use would also help rally numerous states together against Russia.
Just as the Cold War fear of a Soviet takeover of Europe bound the Western powers
together through common cause, so could a Russian nuclear use in combat. This would
undo years worth of foreign policy that has worked to establish close bilateral (and
favorable) relations with numerous European states in an attempt to chip away at the
cohesion of NATO and the European Union (EU). Instead, such an act would strengthen
NATO and the EU with a decidedly anti-Russian objective. Therefore, there would be
both short- and long-term consequences on the Russian economy if it went through with a
nuclear first-use against an adversary, regardless of how justified they may have felt into
doing so.
Finally, the potential for a renewed arms race with the West or the United States
as a result of this action would be equally expensive for the Russian Federation. The
decisions taken by other states in response to Russia‘s nuclear use would only exacerbate
its already strong threat perception. Even Russia‘s partner, China, could potentially be
forced to distance itself and re-evaluate its relationship with Russian Federation. This

300

Shevtsova, Russia - Lost in Transition, 132.

118

could include undertaking defensive countermeasures, reduction of trade and investment,
and the elevation of Russia as a threat to Chinese national security.
The purpose here is not to argue that the Russian Federation would or will use
nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear threat, but to point out that it is not beyond the
realm of possibility and that Russia‘s unique position in the global environment provides
it with a measure of protection from the consequences associated with their use. Their use
alone is not farfetched when considering the number of threats Russia‘s leaders‘ perceive
and the vague definition of what constitutes a threat to the survival of the Russian
Federation. As recently as 2008, the Russian military exercise codenamed ―Stability
2008,‖ a month-long exercise, consisted of a hypothetical local conflict pitting Russia
against the West. The simulated conflict escalated into global war eventually included the
use of nuclear weapons by both sides.301 Clearly the Russian military considers this
scenario possible and intends to be prepared for its eventuality. When considering the
destructive power of nuclear weapons, the current weaknesses of Russia‘s conventional
forces and Russia‘s potential ability to weather the global consequences of employing
nuclear weapons, then the probability of Russian employment of nuclear weapons may
increase.
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION
The Russian Federation will become increasingly dependent on nuclear weapons
for national security in the future. The evidence presented above highlights that this will
be an inescapable fact for the Russian leadership for historic, geographic, demographic
reasons; a threat perception and military doctrine that will necessitate nuclear weapons;
and current conventional capabilities that fall short in relation to the benefits of the
nuclear forces. Despite attempts by the Russian leadership to overcome their reliance on
nuclear weapons, there is no indication in the near future that they will free themselves
from this dependence. As pressures increase in areas such as demographics and improved
conventional and missile defense capabilities by other states, the need to rely on nuclear
weapons will only increase.
Russians have an ingrained and historic fear of invasion and outside threat that
has been reinforced numerous times throughout history, most recently during the Cold
War by the West‘s containment policy directed toward the Soviet Union. The
vulnerability of the Russian state is exacerbated by its geographic position. Also, the
political, economic, and military consequences of the Soviet Union‘s collapse, especially
the territorial losses severely weakened the Russian state. Meanwhile, the negative
population growth and social problems pose a major demographic challenge for the
Russia Federation especially in respect to military conscription. The status of the current
conventional military forces, both personnel and equipment, and the inability of the
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Russian defense industry to ―catch up‖ and produce military technology of equivalent
capability with the West further increases their reliance on nuclear weapons. Finally, the
benefits of nuclear weapons, particularly their reliability and demonstrated destructive
capability, make them the only part of the Russia‘s military forces that are assured to
perform effectively if employed.
The Russian Federation spent most of the 1990s leaning on their strategic nuclear
forces to make up for the deficiencies in their conventional forces. What was meant only
be a ―stop-gap‖ measure has turned into a consistent policy despite persistent attempts at
improvement in conventional forces since 2000. The August 2008 conflict with Georgia
demonstrated that those improvements have had a limited impact. The conflict
emphasized many of the failures and systemic problems within the Russian conventional
forces. Had the conflict lasted longer and Georgian forces put-up more resistance then the
Russian victory could have been much more costly.
Unless substantial and effective reform takes place within the ranks of Russia‘s
conventional forces then these forces will continue to perform poorly and be unprepared
to defend the Russian Federation in the event of a major, or even limited, conflict. The
inability of the Russian defense industry to reform, rebuild, and recruit new talent will
prevent it from producing the types of weapons and technology that Russia‘s military
forces will require in the 21st Century. Without reform in the ranks, elimination of the
destructive practice known as dedovshchina, increased training, and supply of new and
advanced equipment, Russia‘s conventional forces will continue to deteriorate and fail in
the mission to protect the Russian Federation.
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Finally, Russia‘s leaders need to reevaluate their current threat perception and
view of the threat environment facing their country. Russia‘s obsession with invasion and
attack from outside and continued perception of NATO and the United States as threats to
Russia‘s existence is a major obstacle that must be overcome. This faulty perception
dominates Russian planning and outlook, and has prevented the Russian government
from concentrating more on the problems that risk destroying the Russian Federation or
leading to another break-up like in 1991. Domestic terrorism and insurgent groups, drug
use, alcoholism, falling demographics, and social problems such as the spread of
HIV/AIDS are much more current and pressing problems that threaten the future of the
Russian Federation more than an attack or invasion by NATO.
In fact, Russia‘s dependence on it nuclear forces is not necessarily a negative
outcome. Russia‘s leaders could embrace their dependence on nuclear weapons for their
deterrent capability and financial gain. By emphasizing nuclear forces in national defense
instead of a large conventional force, the Russian government can direct its funding and
energies toward overcoming the other social and economic problems faced by the
Federation. Also, if conventional forces are no longer expected to fight a major conflict,
then they can be downsized to allow for the professionalization and modernization of a
smaller military force that is contract based, highly trained and properly equipped.
Obviously there would be a certain level of sacrifice in terms of conventional flexibility
and response; however, Russia‘s current attempt to modernize and maintain a millionman army is not yielding it any benefits. The only major consequence of such a policy is
that the likelihood of a nuclear first-use by the Russian Federation would increase.
However, this is expected to happen anyway under current conditions and Russian policy,
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and if surrounding states realize that the Russian Federation is so heavily reliant on
nuclear weapons then they are less likely to engage in activity that would elicit a nuclear
response in the first place.
Based on current trends, the Russian Federation‘s dependence on nuclear
weapons will continue to increase whether Russia‘s leaders realize it or want it to happen.
This dependence may take a long time to manifest itself and even longer for the Russian
Federation to acknowledge it, if ever. Russia has always perceived itself as a major
military power but that power may soon be limited solely to its nuclear forces. The
problems in Russia continue to spread and, and have an ever increasing impact on the
state and its military position. Whether Russia‘s leaders like it or not, nuclear weapons
will provide them the only means by which to ensure their national security in a world
that they perceive to abound with threats directed against them.
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